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INTRODUCTION
The representation of children in child protective proceedings, i.e. cases in which 
a parent or other person responsible for the care and custody of a child is charged with 
committing acts of child neglect or abuse, originated in the late twentieth century.1  A 
few pioneering states enacted legislation in the 1960’s, and the movement to provide 
legal counsel gained momentum through the enactment of the 1974 Federal Child Abuse 
and Treatment Act, and the subsequent implementation of the Act’s mandate that 
children be afforded “representation” through the appointment of an attorney or lay 
“guardian ad litem.”  Today, the substantial majority of American children are 
represented by legal counsel, and the clear trend is toward universal attorney 
representation.
The development of children’s representation,  however, has been tempered by an 
as yet unresolved controversy concerning the role and responsibilities of the child’s 
counsel.  Usually couched in terms of whether the lawyer should advocate the child’s 
“wishes”, or alternatively, her “best interests”, both approaches unfortunately 
oversimplify the complex nature of representing children, who range in age from the 
1
 A “child protective proceeding” is the generic name for a range of actions filed by the government 
(usually a local or county department of social services) against a parent (or another person who has 
assumed a parenting role).  The initial suit is an abuse or neglect action (called dependency in some states).  
A second type of child protective proceeding is an action, also brought by a governmental entity to 
terminate parental rights, which may be pursued simultaneously with a child neglect or abuse suit, but is 
usually brought months or years after the child has been found to be abused or neglected, and after the 
parent has been afforded a rehabilitative opportunity.  Last, when a child has been placed outside her home 
(e.g., in foster care) as a result of a protective action, but prior to family reunification or adoption of the 
child, the court is required to conduct periodic reviews, commonly known as “permanency hearings”.
3newborn to the near adult. The competing models, frequently prescribed by state statute 
or appellate decisions and analyzed through multiple articles and commentaries, fail to 
meet most children’s needs, and fail to appropriately guide the attorney through the 
complex adversarial course of child protective litigation.
The thesis of this article is that the system should gravitate beyond a “best 
interests” or a “child’s wishes” paradigm, and, to the greatest extent possible, assume a 
traditional attorney-client model.  That is not a new concept – the American Bar 
Association Standards on Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings Act, 
several articles, and at least a few states have tentatively moved in that direction.  To 
continue the progression, I believe we need a greater understanding of the child’s right to 
representation, including his constitutional right to counsel, the child’s role and interest in 
the proceedings (counsel is cast adrift in the absence of his client’s defined rights), and 
the child’s right to be involved as a participant in the litigation.  I also believe we should 
cut a new path through the “thicket” of child’s wishes versus “best interests”.  The new 
path should reinforce the child’s legal role, including his status as a full party to the 
proceedings, recognition of the child’s interests including protection, family integrity, 
and autonomy, and his right to legal representation akin to that of any other party to the 
litigation.
Part I will outline the historical context and address the child’s right to legal 
representation.  Part II discusses the child’s legal status by defining the specific legal 
interests, her procedural rights as a party to the litigation, the right to choose counsel and, 
4perhaps most significantly, the child’s right to be involved as a participant.  The 
penultimate part analyzes the role of the child’s counsel, including an outline of the 
relevant statutes, the diametrically opposed positions of state legislatures and the 
organized bar, and the hopelessly conflicting contemporary caselaw. The final part 
addresses the fundamental deficiencies of the “best interests” and “child’s wishes” 
dichotomy, and suggests a hopefully better approach, one designed to respect and 
implement children’s legal interests.
5PART I: THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
Section 1.  Background
To the contemporary family lawyer, it is difficult to visualize a world where a 
child protection system is unknown.  Or one in which the now ubiquitous “best interests 
of the child” phrase has yet to be coined.  However, child protective laws did not exist 
until the late nineteenth century, and, then, evolved slowly through several generations.  
At that time, children’s rights or interests were irrelevant, precluding the development of 
social or legal mechanisms designed to protect or even articulate children’s interests.2
Dependency and child neglect laws originated when rapid industrialization, 
coupled with massive immigration, precipitated the so-called “child savers” movement of 
the post civil war era.  Child savers zealously pursued the legal protection of 
impoverished or neglected children (often viewing the two as synonymous), and, equally, 
sought measures to ensure the “Americanization” of immigrant youths.3  The result was 
the demise of the ancient poor and apprenticeship laws, which were replaced by fledgling 
child protective systems.
2
 Under common law, parental rights reigned supreme; see Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, 3rd ed. By Thomas Cooley, Basic 1, R. 451 (1884).  The only “safety net”, for children, if 
we can call it that, were the poorhouses or county almshouses, first established by the English Elizabethan 
Poor Law of 1601, and subsequently replicated throughout the United States – institutions where young 
children received basic sustenance until they reached the age at which they could be boarded out as 
apprentices; see e.g., David M. Schneider, The History of Public Welfare in New York State, 1609-1866,
University of Chicago Press, 1938, at 75-77.  The poorhouses expanded rapidly during the early nineteenth 
century, contributing to the need for a formal child protective system; see Robert H. Bremner, Children and 
Youth in America, Vol. 1, at 639 (1970).
3
 See Anthony J. Platt, The Child Savers, University of Chicago Press, 1969.  
6In 1877 New York enacted a comprehensive “Act for Protecting Children,” 
granting the courts jurisdiction over any child under the age of 14 who, inter alia, was 
found to be begging or receiving alms, was destitute or vagrant, whose parent was 
“vicious,” or who lacked “proper guardianship”.4  Illinois enacted similar legislation in 
18795.  By 1900 most states had legislated child protection acts.
Under the early child protective measures, the courts (specifically the lower trial 
courts) were granted summary commitment power, i.e., would summarily place or 
“commit” a child to a public or private child care agency for an indefinite period, or until 
the child reached the age of twenty-one.6  Basic due process standards, such as notice, 
were disregarded or statutorily abrogated.  Appellate review was unavailable.7  When 
challenged, the vague definitions were upheld by invoking the state’s authority to protect 
children as “parens patriae”.8  Subsequently, the child protective statutes were enforced 
by the specialized juvenile courts established in the early twentieth century.9
4
 New York Laws, 1877, Chapter 428.
5
 Revised Laws of Illinois, 1879, pp. 309-13; the Illinois Act was initially limited to girls.
6
 See New York Laws, 1884, Chapter 713.
7See People X. Rel. Van Riper v. New York City Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 13 N.E. 435 (1887), 
for a discussion of the plenary powers exercised by the courts, limited, as is that case, only by extraordinary 
habeas corpus jurisdiction (a young girl had been committed pursuant to New York’s vague statute for 
allegedly being in the company of a prostitute who she had asked for directions; denied the right of appeal, 
her father filed a habeas corpus writ). 
8
 See In the Matter of Petition of Alexander Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (1882), and People v. Ewer, 141 N.Y. 129, 
36 N.E. 4 (1894).
9
 The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899; Revised Statutes of the State of Illinois, 1899m 
Chapter 23.51.
7Indeed, early “child saver” acts continued, with only minor revision, through most 
of the twentieth century.10  One has only to read the landmark 1967 Gault decision11 to 
view the largely unchanged nineteenth century landscape. (Although, Gault involved 
juvenile delinquency, similar if not identical procedures were applied nationally to child 
protective proceedings.)  Hidden behind strict privacy and confidentiality rules, the mid-
twentieth century child protective judicial proceeding was virtually identical to the “child 
savers” era of informal summary adjudication.  
During the child protective system’s first century (roughly 1870-1970), the child 
was assumed to have absolutely no legal standing or role.  After an informal inquiry, 
perhaps augmented by the verbal report of a probation officer, the court would determine 
parental guilt or innocence.  Upon finding parental guilt, the judge would assume the role 
of “parens patriae.”  The parents could be placed under supervision, or the child could be 
removed from the home and placed with a private or public agency.  In effect, the child 
would be entrusted to an executive agency, one which retained parenting responsibility 
until the youth reached majority.  The court would never see the case again.12
In the “parens patriae” milieu, the need for legal representation was never 
perceived.  However rarely, a parent, who was always deemed to be a party to the 
proceedings, could appear with privately retained counsel.  But the child was not 
10
 See, e.g. Children’s Court Act, State of New York, §2(4), 1923.  
11
 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 7527 (1967).
12
 Motions such as continuing jurisdiction, modification, or periodic reviews were unknown.  But see 
Matter of Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 53 N.E. 676 (1899), where the New York Court of Appeals held that a 
parent who had self-rehabilitated could petition the court to reclaim custody. 
8considered a party, and any form of private or public representation was precluded.  In 
truth, there was little that counsel for the parent, or for the child, could have achieved.  
Writing shortly before the Supreme Court Gault decision, Professor Alfred J. Kahn 
observed:
Most children’s courts cases are heard without counsel, and many with 
experience in children’s court agree that lawyers, as currently prepared, 
ordinarily contribute very little to such proceedings, particularly where no 
question exists about the truth of the allegations.13
It is only in the post-Gault era that representation became potentially meaningful.  
Hence, only in the past forty years has the delivery of legal services for children become 
worthy of asserting, litigating, and legislating.14  And it is only in the contemporary post-
Gault era that children’s’ rights and independent interests have been pursued.  In recent 
decades, the judicial authority in dealing with child protection has also been significantly 
strengthened, effectively raising the stakes for parents and for children.  Specific 
dispositional provisions (as opposed to summary placement or general supervisory 
orders) have become the norm, with periodic review and continuing jurisdiction to 
modify or vacate judicial orders.  So too, concepts of family preservation, the least 
detrimental alternative doctrine, and kinship foster care placement are products of the 
13
 Alfred J. Kahn, A Court for Children, Columbia University Press (1963), at p. 100.
14
 Although the first child representative statute preceded Gault by five years (see Section 2), the attorney’s 
role was extremely tentative and uncertain, at least until the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision.
9most recent generation.  The possibilities and, consequently, the need for social services 
and legal guidance, have become far more pronounced.15
In light of this history, it is not surprising that the responsibilities and role of the 
child’s attorney has been slow to develop, and that a consensus has been difficult to 
achieve.  So too, the status of the child as an integral part of the proceedings has only 
evolved during the past two generations.  It is these issues which will be discussed in 
succeeding sections.
Section 2.  The Advent of Children’s Representation
In 1962, the New York State Legislature “. . . finding that counsel [for children] is 
often indispensable to a practical realization of due process of law and may be helpful in 
making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition”,16 authorized 
the New York Family Court to appoint attorneys to represent children.17  Given the title 
of “law guardian”, but defined as “. . . an attorney admitted to practice law in the state of 
New York and designated under this part to represent minors . . .”, child representation 
was mandated.18  The Act applied to child protective proceedings, as well as several other 
actions involving children, such as juvenile delinquency.  New York thereby became the 
first state to provide counsel for children.  The representation of children had formed a 
15
 Judicial modification of existing child protective orders have been possible for a long time (see Matter of 
Knowack, supra note 12), but were rarely used before the late twentieth century.
16
 L. 1962, c. 686, codified  as  Section 241 of the New York Family Court Act.
17
 NY Fam. Ct. Act §249(a).  
18
 NY Fam. Ct. Act §242.  
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bridgehead, though expansion beyond New York was slow -- and the role and 
responsibilities of the child’s attorney was far from clear.
Not long thereafter, the principal that the child should have a voice in proceedings 
which, after all, are brought to protect her, achieved national application with the 
enactment of the 1974 Federal Child Abuse and Treatment Protection Act (CAPTA).19
CAPTA requires every state to “ensure the appointment of a guardian ad litem or other 
individual whom the state recognizes as fulfilling the same function as a guardian ad 
litem, to represent and protect the rights and best interests of the child”.20  However, a 
guardian ad litem is a far different creature than an attorney.21  And, as will be discussed, 
CAPTA’s prescriptive language incorporates several ambiguities and inconsistencies.  
But at least CAPTA mandated that every child be “represented” in some manner, 
however primitive and ambiguous.  On the down side, however, CAPTA enacted during 
the nascent period of child representation, has contributed greatly to the dilemmas and 
conflicts that continue to plague the field of children’s representation.
Implementation of CAPTA was initially accomplished largely through the 
establishment of the Court Appointed Special Advocate program (CASA), involving the 
appointment of “citizen” or lay volunteers to represent the interests of children.  
19
 See 45 CFR §134.14.  
20
 § 1340.14(g).
21
 A guardian ad litem is assigned to make legal decisions for a legally incompetent client, including a 
client who is a minor; in fact, the guardian ad litem usually retains an attorney and then, acting as a client, 
instructs the attorney and authorizes or consents to appropriate legal measures.  For example, when a child 
is injured in an automobile accident, the court appoints a guardian ad litem, who retains an attorney and 
assumes the role of client.
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Originating in Seattle, Washington, the CASA program quickly expanded nationally, 
resulting in the widespread representation of children by, at best, marginally trained part-
time non-lawyers acting as guardians ad litem.22  CASA subsequently gained federal 
recognition when Congress authorized funding through state grants to provide training 
and administrative oversight.23  In reality, CASA was devised as an inexpensive “quick 
fix” method to comply with the CAPTA mandate, one which guaranteed compliance 
without the commitment of significant financial resources.  Children gained a guardian ad 
litem representative who might advocate for their interests, but that representative lacked 
the authority, the training, and the tools to appropriately present a case before a court of 
law (unlike attorneys, CASA volunteers cannot subpoena records, call witnesses, conduct 
cross-examination, file motions, or appeal).24  Further, the most important traditional 
purpose of a guardian ad litem, the guidance of counsel, was abrogated when legislators 
failed to authorize or finance legal representation (frequently, the very purpose of 
appointing a volunteer guardian ad litem was to avoid the necessity of legal 
representation).
Once implemented, the inherent inadequacies of CASA programs contributed to 
the post-CAPTA growth of attorney representation.  Granted at least nominal non-lawyer 
22
 See Jean Koh Peters, Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings; Ethical and Practical 
Dimensions, Lexis Law Publishing, 1997, at 28-29.  
23
  See Pub. L. No. 101-647 (1990).  
24CASA programs do not necessarily operate in isolation, or without legal service backup.  Several 
programs employ attorneys, to advise the CASA volunteers, or appear in court to afford actual legal 
representation in some cases.  The common practice, however, is to employ CASA in lieu of legal 
representation.
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representation in the form of a lay volunteer, who might well raise significant legal issues 
which he could not address , the judiciary, legislators, and the organized bar began to 
focus on the desirability of affording legal counsel.  Over the course of the thirty year 
period since the initial legislation, the majority of states have enacted statutes requiring 
the legal representation of children, i.e., the assignment of an attorney to represent the 
child, or have permitted the court to assign an attorney on a discretionary basis.  The 
result is the current mixture of legal and lay representation, with children’s attorneys 
acting as guardians ad litem, or as counsel to the youngster (with or without the 
assistance of a CASA volunteer), or blending the two seemingly inconsistent roles. 25
Nationally, as of 2004 over half of the states provide for the assignment of an 
attorney.  In some, appointment is mandatory, i.e., the court must appoint counsel.26  In 
other states, assignment of counsel is discretionary,27 while in a few an attorney must be 
appointed if an older child requests an attorney,28 or if the guardian ad litem’s 
recommendations conflict with the child’s wishes.29
25
 The current CAPTA provision, as amended in 2000, stipulates that “In every case involving an abused or 
neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding, a guardian ad litem, who may be an attorney or a 
court-appointed special advocate (or both), shall be appointed to represent the child in such proceedings”; 
42 U.S.C.A. §5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (West 2004].  
26
 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §7B-600 (2004), D.C. Code Ann. §16-2304(b)(3) (2004), Kan. Stat. Ann. §38-
1505(a)( (2004), and PA Cons. Stat. Ann. §6382 (West 1999).
27
 See, e.g. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §432B, 420(1) (2004), and S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-1510(B) (2004).
28
 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §13.34.100(6) (West 2004).
29
 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §169-C:10(II) (2004), Wis. Stat. Ann. §48.235 (West 2004).
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However, the close to equal division masks the fact that most of the larger states 
require legal representation; those include California,30 the District of Columbia,31
Illinois,32 Massachusetts,33 and New York34.  And, although assignment in every neglect 
or abuse case is not required in Texas, appointment is mandatory in the relatively large 
number of cases in which termination of parental rights is at issue.35
The prevalence of mandatory appointment in the more populous states, with 
correspondingly large numbers of child protective cases, coupled with the discretionary 
appointment provisions enacted by several additional jurisdictions, assures that the 
significant majority of children are provided legal representation. Although precise 
national statistics are unavailable (and would be exceedingly difficult to compute in light 
of the approximately fifteen “discretionary” states, where appointment is determined by 
individual judges on a case by case basis), probably at least two-thirds of the children 
who find themselves enmeshed in child protective actions are represented by an attorney 
(and, the number grows each year).  That, in itself, constitutes an important achievement.  
As has been noted, the number of children represented in any manner or form was zero in 
30
 See Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code §317.  The California state requirement is recent; interestingly, in 1995 the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court adopted a rule mandating the appointment of counsel for the child, a 
move that was unsuccessfully contested by the county, which objected to the mandatory cost; Los Angeles 
Dept. of Children and Family Services v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County; 51 Cal. App. 4th
1257, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (Ct. of Appeal, 2nd App. Dist. 1996).
31
 D.C. Code Ann. §16-2304(b)(3) (2004).
32
 Il. St. Ch. 705 §405 12-17 (2004).
33
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 119, §29.
34
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §249.
35
 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §107.012; the Texas statute uses the unusual term “attorney ad litem”.
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1960.  Forty-five years later, a clear majority are represented by an attorney, and the 
remainder are at least afforded representation by a non-lawyer guardian ad litem.  
Section 3.  The Child’s Constitutional Right to Counsel
One intriguing albeit largely unanswered question is whether the child is 
constitutionally entitled to counsel.  The issue could be raised in terms of the right to 
counsel under the United States Constitution, or could be asserted pursuant to the right of 
counsel, due process, or equal protection provisions found in most state constitutions. 
Although litigated sporadically, the claim has gone largely unnoticed and unasserted.  
When raised, however, the argument has succeeded.  The conundrum is why, almost fifty 
years after the Gault decision and thirty years after the enactment of CAPTA, the issue 
remains elusive.
As a starting point concerning the right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense”.  Although originally 
interpreted as the right to be represented by retained counsel, in 1963 the United States 
Supreme Court held that every person accused of committing a felony must be afforded 
representation, regardless of his financial ability.36  Four years later, in Gault the Court 
extended the right to juvenile delinquency cases, i.e., proceedings in which a child is 
accused of committing a crime.37
36 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355, 83 S. Ct. 792, L.Ed. 2nd 799 (1963).
37 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 875 Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed. 2nd 527 (1967).
15
Ergo, the right to counsel in criminal and juvenile justice cases is secure.  
However, the extension beyond the criminal law, specifically to child protective 
proceedings, has been largely unpursued.  The United States Supreme Court has never 
determined whether children in protective proceedings are constitutionally entitled to 
representation.  True, the court has held that indigent parents are not automatically 
entitled to assigned counsel, at least in termination of parental rights actions,38  but that 
does not preclude the constitutional right of a child, a fact recognized in the handful of 
cases where the child has in fact asserted the right.39
In 1976, only two years after Congress enacted CAPTA, a three judge Federal 
district court panel, in the case of Roe v. Conn, held that the child who is involved in a 
neglect proceeding is constitutionally entitled to representation:  “the plaintiffs maintain 
that Alabama child custody procedure violates the due process clauses of the Constitution 
because that procedure does not provide for the appointment of independent counsel to 
represent a child in a neglect proceeding, and non was appointed here.  We agree, if the 
parents are indigent, free counsel should be afforded to the child.”40  The case, which 
involved several unrelated issues, subsequently settled without an appeal.
38 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed. 2nd 640 (1901).   
39
 A few state courts have nevertheless found a constitutional right to counsel for the parent when she is 
accused of child neglect or is in jeopardy of losing parental rights.  See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 
N.E.2d 1071 (App. Ct. Ill., 2nd Dist. 2000), Matter of Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 285 
N.E.2d 288 (1972).
40 Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (D.C. Ala. 1976).
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Seventeen years later a New York Appellate Court held that in a neglect or abuse 
case the child possesses a constitutional right to counsel.  Applying a Mathews v. 
Eldridge analysis,41 the court in Matter of Jamie TT. concluded that the child “. . . has a 
constitutional as well as statutory right to legal representation of her interest in the 
proceedings on the abuse petition”42.  Interestingly, New York statutorily provides for the 
assignment of counsel in every case.  The court ruled that the child had received 
ineffective representation, based on the fact counsel is constitutional required.
In the same year as Jamie T.T. the issue of whether the child is constitutionally 
entitled to counsel in a termination of parental rights case was raised before the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court.  Since an Oklahoma statute provided for the appointment of 
counsel on a discretionary basis, the court, implying that the child did enjoy a 
constitutional right, ordered that the relevant trial court appoint counsel for the child in 
every case, thereby converting the discretionary statutory power into a mandatory one 
without addressing the constitutional question directly.43
41 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976).
42 Matter of Jamie TT, 191 A.D. 2nd 132, 599 .N.Y.S. 2nd 892 (3rd Dept. 1993), New York statutorily 
provides for representation (see N.Y Family Court Act §249); in Jamie TT the constitutional argument was 
asserted for the purpose of arguing that as a constitutional matter the child is entitled to effective 
representation.
43 Matter of Guardianship of S.A.W., 856 P.2d 286 (Okla. Sup. Ct. (1993).  The statute stipulated that 
“when it appears to the court that the  minor or his parent or guardian desires counsel but is indigent and 
cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court shall appoint counsel”; the interpretation that counsel was 
mandated in each and every case would indeed be weak in the absence of a constitutional overlay.  An 
interesting albeit non-definitive case is In the Interest of D.B. and D.S., 385 So.3rd 83 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1980), 
in a case which involved the constitutional right to counsel for indigent parents stated, as brief dicta, that 
they found no constitutional right of counsel for the child (385 So.2d 83, 91).
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To complete the current caselaw, this year a Federal District Court in Georgia 
held, in Kenny A. v. Sonny Perdue, that the child involved in a protective case is 
constitutionally entitled to counsel.44  Interesting, the court found that, Georgia, like New 
York (In Jamie TT.) statutorily provides for legal representation.45  (The court’s 
conclusion regarding mandated counsel, based on a confusingly worded statute, softened 
the constitutional ramifications.)  The plaintiff-children in Kenny A. alleged that 
astronomically high caseloads of the attorneys who represent children preclude effective 
representation.  Georgia responded by asserting that since the state was not 
constitutionally required to provide counsel, the constitutional doctrine of effective 
representation is inapplicable.  The court disagreed:
Even if there were not a statutory right to counsel for children in 
deprivation [neglect] cases and TPR [termination of parental rights] 
proceedings, the Court concludes that such a right is guaranteed under the 
Due Process clause of the Georgia Constitution, Art. I, §1, P. 1.  It is well 
settled that children are afforded protection under the Due Process Clauses 
of both the United States and Georgia constitutions and are entitled to 
constitutionally adequate procedural due process when their liberty or 
property rights are at stake . . .
The Court finds that children have fundamental liberty interests at stake in 
deprivation and TPR proceedings.  These include a child’s interest in his 
or her own safety, health, and well-being, as well as an interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship 
with his or her biological parents . . .  The Court concludes that plaintiff 
foster children have a right to counsel in deprivation and TPR proceedings 
under the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution.46
44
 356 F.Supp.3d 1353 (N.D. GA. 2005).  The decision applies to “deprivation” proceedings, the Georgia  
equivalent of neglect or dependency, and to termination of parental rights proceedings.
45
 See O.C.G.A. §15-11-6(b) (2004).
46
 356 F.Supp.3d 1353, 1359.
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Over the course of thirty years (commencing with Roe) there have been four 
powerful cases in which the child’s constitutional right to counsel has been upheld47.  
Oddly, none of the succeeding cases have cited Roe or mentioned any other precedent 
(by 2005 and Kenny A. there were three earlier precedents).  It’s as though each case was 
decided in a complete vacuum.  An even greater oddity is that the issue has been litigated 
in only four states. Have not children’s lawyers throughout the country thought of the 
issue?  Have they not read the caselaw?  (The virtual absence of litigation which would 
improve the lives of children may be a sad commentary on the ability of effectiveness of 
children’s rights organizations.)  There exists no case in which a state appellate court or a 
federal court has rejected the claim that the child is constitutionally entitled to 
representation.  Given the precedent of the four successful cases (and no case in which 
the claim failed), surely the issue should be asserted in every jurisdiction which does not 
require the assignment of counsel.  And in those jurisdictions which statutorily provide 
representation, the constitutional standard of effective representation should obviously be 
implemented – in fact, Jamie TT and Kenny A. were determined in states where every 
child is at least nominally represented.  In short, the issue should be pursued from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific.
47
 Another interesting pro child’s right to counsel case is In re Adoption/Guardianship Number T97036305, 
350 MD. 1, 746 A.2d 379 (Court Appeals MD. 2000).  Since Maryland provides representation, the court 
did not reach the constitutional issue, but emphasized the importance of counsel.
19
If the trend continues (hopefully faster than the slow motion pattern seen thus far), 
the ramifications will be extremely significant.  First, universal representation will 
become the norm, whether the case involves child neglect, abuse, permanency planning, 
or termination of parental rights.  Second, the child will be entitled to constitutionally 
effective representation, i.e., counsel will be held to a relatively high standard of 
quality.48  Finally, the thorny issue of the attorney for the child’s responsibilities and role 
will be largely defused.  When one is constitutionally entitled to representation, one is 
presumptively entitled to a lawyer who acts as a lawyer, not a guardian ad litem, or some 
vague hybrid attempting to fuse the role of counsel and guardian.49
48
 That was the issue in Jamie TT, supra note 42; the child had an attorney, but the case was reversed on the 
ground that he failed to provide effective representation.  
49
 However, the issue could not be completely resolved, particularly in cases involving very young 
children; Part IV, Section 3.
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PART II:  THE CHILD’S LEGAL STATUS IN A PROTECTIVE PROCEEDING
To a large extent, a person’s rights and obligations flow from that individual’s 
legal status.  For example, one must have standing to bring suit as a prerequisite to 
considering whether a perceived wrong may be legally rectified.  A citizen may have 
specific legal rights which can be addressed by the court, while a non-citizen lacks the 
status to assert the same right.  Or a person must be legally “aggrieved” to appeal a 
judicial decision – mere dissatisfaction does not qualify.  As a corollary, an attorney’s 
authority and actions reflect the individual client’s legal status.  To cite one obvious 
example, the lawyer’s authority is very limited indeed when the client lacks standing to 
seek legal redress.  Similarly, the attorney who represents the second mortgagee in a 
foreclosure action is in a weaker position than the attorney who represents the first 
mortgagee.  Or a lawyer representing a party to the proceedings has far greater scope than 
one who represents a witness (such as the right to cross-examine every person who 
testifies).
The above rather primitive description seems obvious.  In fact, almost everyone 
understands those fundamentals – that is, everyone understands until one speaks of a 
child who is involved in a child protective (or custody) proceeding.  What are the child’s 
legal expectations?  What are her legal rights?  Which mechanisms are available to assert 
those rights and expectations in the context of the particular proceeding?  Does the child 
enjoy any individual rights which he may legally demand?  Unfortunately, many of these 
critical questions lack definitive answers.  The absence of a national consensus 
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concerning the child’s legal status, rights, and expectations in a child protective 
proceeding have, in large measure, precipitated the current uncertainties, dilemmas, and 
conflicts concerning the legal representation of children.  Unless the attorney knows the 
child client’s rights, she can hardly be expected to form a decisive legal goal or strategy.  
In an automobile personal injury action, the plaintiff child has standing to bring the action 
(perhaps acting through a guardian ad litem), is a party to the proceeding, and has the 
legal right to receive compensatory damages for his injuries.  His lawyer is entrusted with 
the job of commencing suit, and employing every ethical pursuit to maximize the sought 
after economic recovery.  In a juvenile delinquency case, to bring the matter closer to the 
subject at hand, the child’s status is that of legal respondent, i.e., one accused of 
committing a crime.  Hence specific due process rights apply, and the child’s goal is to 
achieve a dismissal or, in the absence of dismissal, the least restrictive disposition.  The 
attorney’s role parallels that of the client.  Thus, the attorney zealously protects the 
child’s due process rights, seeks dismissal and, failing that, negotiates or litigates for the 
least restrictive disposition.  But what about a child protective case?
This part will discuss the basic attributes of what we might broadly call, for lack 
of a better phrase, the “status” of the child.  The initial discussion will be whether the 
child is a “party” to the proceedings.  I shall then discuss the right of the child to choose 
or retain a specific lawyer, the right to be present and participate in the proceedings, and 
the specific substantive legal interests which the child may assert.  Hopefully, a 
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discussion of these basic taken-for-granted “adult” rights will lead to a better 
understanding of the child’s status and role -- and, accordingly, counsel’s status and role.
Section 2.  The Child as a Party
In a civil proceeding (and a child protective case is civil litigation), any individual 
whose cognizable interest may be adversely affected is granted “party” status, or at least 
has the option to join or intervene as a party.  In New York, for example, the applicable 
statutes stipulate that “persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded 
between the person’s who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected 
by a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiffs or defendants.”,50 and, further, 
provide that a person must be permitted to intervene in the action “[w]hen the 
representation of the person’s interest by the parties is or may be inadequate and the 
person is or may be bound by the judgment”.51  Thus, if “A” brings suit against “B” and 
the outcome may affect the legal interest of “C“, “C” must be joined as a necessary party, 
or possesses the right to intervene as a party.  The clear intent is to bring every relevant 
person before the court, guaranteeing interested parties the ability to participate and to be 
heard, and ensuring that the ultimate decision or judgment will be binding on everyone 
who has a stake in the litigation.
An essential feature of party status is the automatic applicability of a large 
“bundle” of procedural and substantive rights.  A party has the right to be represented by 
50
 N.Y. Civil Practice Law & Rules 1001(a) (McKinney’s 2004).
51
 Id. §1012.
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counsel (though not necessarily the right to assigned representation), discovery rights, 
standing to participate in motion practice, the literal right to a chair at a table at the front 
of the courtroom, the right to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to argue, the 
ability to consent or to withhold consent to a proposed resolution, and the right to appeal 
any adverse decision.52
Every child protective proceeding involves two obvious necessary parties – the 
parent (or other person responsibility for the child), and the state (either directly or 
through a statutory delegation, as when a child care agency is the petitioner).  But what 
about the child?  After all, the child has a obvious cognizable interest in the outcome – it 
is her life and her interests that are at issue.  The child surely meets the definition of a 
“party” (in New York or any other state); it is inarguable that she “might be equitably 
affected”, is “bound by the judgment”, and her interests may be inadequately represented 
by the other parties (the parent and the state).
Despite meeting the traditional criteria, until recently the child has not been 
recognized as a party.  Historically, the proceedings were viewed as a straight parent-
state contest.  The right or ability to participate, either directly or through the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem, was simply off the radar screen.53
The child’s status began to evolve with the assignment of counsel or a guardian ad 
litem.  Whichever 1974 CAPTA alternative a jurisdiction chose, someone responsible for 
52
 In some circumstances, a non-party may enjoy one or more of these rights; the point is that party status 
confers these rights automatically.
53
 See page 6.
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the child’s specific rights and interests had been injected into the proceedings.  That 
person would likely (or hopefully) advocate a position, whether based on the child’s 
wishes, the perceived best interest of the child, or an amalgam of both.  Further, the 
child’s spokesperson might want to introduce evidence, or at least assure that evidence 
was introduced to support her position.  And, if the decision was viewed as adverse to the 
child’s interest, she might want the case to be determined by a higher court.  If an 
attorney, the individual assigned to meet the CAPTA requirement would naturally want 
to call and cross-examine witnesses, argue legal points, and file written material.  
Lawyers are trained to represent real parties, and to make extensive use of the tools of 
their trade in the course of implementing such representation.
In the thirty post-CAPTA years, the child’s status in the proceedings has indeed 
mutated, but on an ad hoc basis with no discernable national rule.  In several states, such 
as Indiana and Ohio, the child has been statutorily granted party status,54 while in other 
states, such as Maine, he has gained party status through case law.55  Perhaps the most 
definitive statement of party status can be found in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 
54
 See In. Code Ann. §3103409-7 (2004) which stipulates that “The (1) child, (2) child’s parents, guardian 
or custodian; (3) county office of family and children; and (4) guardian ad litem or court appointed special 
advocate; are parties to the proceeding.”  Interestingly, the child and guardian ad litem are deemed separate 
parties.  See also Md. C. J. §3-801(r) and Minn. R. Proc. For Dist. Ct. R. 909 (1999) which deems the 
guardian ad litem a party.  Also see In re Williams, 805 N.E.2d 1110 (Sup. Ct. Ohio 2004), when the Ohio 
‘Supreme Court held that the child has a right to assigned counsel “. . . based on the juvenile’s status as a 
party to the proceeding.”
55
 See In re Nikolas E. 720 A.3d 562, 1998 ME 243 (Sup .Jud. Ct. Maine, 1998).  
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T97036005,56 where the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Maryland Code confers 
party status on the child, and proceeded to reverse a termination of parental rights 
determination, agreed to by the parents and the state, on the ground that the child had 
failed to consent to the disposition:
The primary issue we must decide in each case is whether the trial court 
violated the constitutional and/or statutory rights of the children by 
granting the petition . . . to terminate parental rights when both parents 
either affirmatively consented or were statutorily deemed to have 
consented, without first providing the children with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard on the merits of the petition.  We shall hold that 
these children had this right, and accordingly, shall reverse. 
We conclude that because the child is a party to the guardianship petition, 
the child has a right to assistance of counsel and the right to notice of the 
petition and opportunity to object thereto.  These rights in turn entitle the 
child, when the child objects to the petition, to a hearing on the merits of 
the petition.57
Nationally, the more prevalent reaction has been to skirt the issue by statutorily 
providing specific party rights to the child, while refraining from explicitly conferring 
party status itself.  Thus, in Illinois the child has the right to be present, to be heard, to 
present evidence, examine records, and cross-examine witnesses.58  In New York, which 
provided for the legal representations of children well before 1974 CAPTA mandate, the 
child, acting through counsel, has the statutory right to file certain motions,59 and the 
56
 746 A.2d 379 Md. 1 (Ct. of Appeals, Md., 2000).
57
 746 A.2d 379, 380.
58
 See Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Cd. 705 §405/1-5 [West 2004].
59
 See N.Y.S.F.C.A. §1039.
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right to move for the modification or recision of any relevant court order.60  In addition, 
the child, through her attorney, may file a petition (subject to court approval),61 or appeal 
an adverse order.62  Delaware has held that the child is, in effect, a de facto party, 
concluding that although he “may not be a party in the formal sense . . .” he is 
nevertheless “an integral party” entitled to be heard.63  In still other states the child is 
statutorily referred to as a “party” for at least some purposes, a fact which, as in Georgia, 
convinced at least one court that the state has granted the minor full party status for every 
purpose.64 It may be that in Delaware and Georgia the child is indeed a party (even in the 
absence of an explicit statute), and in Illinois and New York she comes close.  But in 
other states the child unfortunately possesses less than the full array of “party” rights, or 
the issue has not been addressed.
The upshot is that in most (but not all) American jurisdictions (unlike Indiana, 
Maryland, Ohio, Maine and Georgia) the child is a “virtual” or de facto party with many, 
if not all, the rights of an “actual” party; and the specific rights vary from state to state.  
The magic word “party” has been largely avoided, permitting courts and legislatures to 
stop short of granting the child full party rights, while simultaneously conferring many 
60
 N.Y.F.C.A. §1061.  
61
 See Matter of St. George, (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Monroe Co. 2000).
62
 See Commitment of Fernando v. Legal Aid Society of N.Y.C., 275 A.D.2d 280, 712 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st
Dept. 2000).  
63 Matter of the Petition Samantha Nicole Frazer, 721 A.2d 920 (1998) (Sup. Ct. Del. 1998).  
64
 See Kenny A. v. Sonny Perdue, 356 F.Supp. 2d 1353 (DC North Georgia 2005).
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party rights on a piecemeal basis.  (The present scheme is rather inefficient; it would be 
easier to enact the one word, “party”, than to prescribe each and every right separately).  
As noted earlier, recognition of the child as a formal party in child protective 
cases would resolve many of the problems and dilemmas which continue to plague the 
field, and would further the development of the mature child client-attorney relationship 
which this article advocates.65  The ordinary attributes of a party would presumably 
apply, including the rights to notice, participation, presentment of evidence, the need to  
agree to settlements or dispositions, and the right to appeal.  The right to representation 
by assigned counsel would also logically flow from party status, or at least a strong 
argument for representation could be made.  After all, a party possesses the implicit right 
to present witnesses, cross-examine, argue and file appropriate motions.  Although adults 
have the right to proceed pro se (even when entitled to assigned counsel), one would 
hardly expect a child to pursue these endeavors (or to attend every appearance or hearing, 
a routine which pro se representation entails).66  The clear trend has been toward party 
status – and the recognition of the rights which explicitly or implicitly flow from 
achieving that position should, hopefully, gain strength in the near future.
Section 3.  The Right of the Child to Choose Counsel
65
 See Section 2.  It should be noted that the child would not be a petitioner or a respondent, but would be a 
necessary third party.
66
 The recent Georgia holding that the child is constitutionally entitled to counsel, Kenny A. v. Sonney 
Perdue, supra note 44, was in part predicated on the fact that the child is indeed a party.
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Appellate courts in several states have held that the child, or at least the older 
child, has the right to be represented by counsel of her choosing.  The decisions often 
reflect a statutory provision.  In California, where the relevant statute states that a minor 
“has the right to be represented . . . by counsel of his or her own choice,” the Court of 
Appeal held that the trial court is obligated to honor the child’s choice, assuming the 
particular youth is competent to decide, i.e., possesses the minimally requisite capacity or 
maturity.67  New York law provides that the minors “. . . should be represented by 
counsel of their own choosing or by law guardians”,68 prompting the appellate courts to 
hold that the child must be permitted to substitute an attorney she wanted for court 
appointed counsel where “. . . the child has indicated her lack of trust in her appointed 
representative, her fear that this representative will not effectively communicate her 
wishes to the court and her belief that the law guardian has been influenced by her 
adoptive mother . . .”.69  In a similar vein, Illinois and Alaska courts have recognized the 
right of the “competent” child to choose or substitute counsel.70  To be sure, the right to 
select counsel is dependent on the child’s competence, and the absence of parental or 
other manipulation.  As noted by the Illinois Court, “We recognize that a minor’s right to 
select substitute counsel is not absolute.  However, in the present case the judge 
67 Akkiko M. v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App.3d 525, 209 Cal. Reptr. 568 (1985).
68
 N.Y.F.C.A. §241.
69 Matter of Elianne M., 196 A.D.2d 439, 601 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (1st Dept. 1993); see also Albanese v. 
Lee, 272 A.D.2d 81, 707 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dept. 2000), and Redder v. Redder, 17 A.D.3d 10, 792 
N.Y.S.2d 201 (3d Dept. 2005).
70 In the Interest of A.W., 248 Ill. App. 3d 971, 618 Misc.2d 729 (App. Ct. 16th Div. 1993), and Wagstaff v. 
Superior Court, Family Court Division, 535 P.2d 1220 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1975).  
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conducted an extensive hearing, with both sides presenting evidence to address the issue 
of whether A.W. was coerced or manipulated into the decision to substitute private 
counsel for the Public Guardian”.71
The right to choose counsel, a fundamental principle of American law, has 
significant repercussions for children.  If children are considered parties to protective 
proceedings, participants who enjoy equal or substantially similar rights to adult parties, 
at least when they are competent to exercise those rights, the ability to retain counsel is 
implicit.  To a great extent, the existing caselaw confirms those rights without explicitly 
holding that the child is a party.  Equally, counsel whom the child selects will advocate 
what the child wishes, or what counsel and child jointly formulate.  Surely none of the 
children involved in these cases wanted an attorney who would advocate what he 
perceived as the child’s “best interests”.  In fact, in each case the child sought, 
successfully, to dismiss a lawyer who refused to trust the child as a competent party, i.e. 
enter into the normal attorney-client relationship.72
Several other states, which follow the prevalent guardian ad litem model, provide 
either that the child may request the appointment of independent counsel, or that the 
Court may assign counsel when the child and guardian ad litem disagree.  In Maine the 
71
 618 N.E.2d 729, 733.
72
 Retaining independent counsel is not easy for a child.  In some cases a relative initiates the process and 
may compensate counsel, while in others the child seeks assistance from a legal clinic or other publicly 
funded group.  An attorney may accept the case on a pro bono basis; or, the child or attorney may request 
that the court substitute appointed counsel.  But one substantial impediment is the lack of knowledge 
concerning the right to choose counsel.  It’s safe to say that even in California, Illinois, and New York, i.e., 
states that permit the practice, few children are advised that they possess the right – and, obviously, even 
fewer youths exercise the right.
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child may request the appointment of “legal counsel”,73 while in Washington the Court 
“may appoint an attorney to represent the child’s position”, “if the child requests legal 
counsel and is age twelve or older.”74  Although stopping short of an absolute right to 
counsel, these statutes recognize the need for the child’s position to be independently 
represented, and for the competent child’s right to be represented though the normal 
attorney-client relationship.  The child who requests representation always intends that 
counsel will advocate his position, or at least that the attorney will develop a position 
with the close collaboration of the child.
Last, several statutes provide for the appointment of counsel when the child’s 
position conflicts with that of the guardian ad litem.  For example, in New Hampshire “. . 
. where the child’s expressed interests conflict with the recommendation for dispositional 
orders of the guardian ad litem, the Court may appoint an attorney to represent the 
interests of the child”.75  In Ohio an attorney guardian ad litem serves as both guardian 
and counsel, but if a conflict exists the Court may substitute the guardian ad litem, 
leaving the original assigned attorney as counsel.76
Although couched in discretionary terms (the Court “may” appoint counsel), this 
set of statutes takes cognizance of the child’s right to seek independent counsel to 
73
 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 22 §4005(1)(F) (West 2004).
74
 Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §13.34.100 (2004).
75
 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §169-C:10 (IT) (2004).
76
 Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.281(17) 2005.  See also Miss. Code Ann. §43-21-121(4) (2004), 
Minn. R. Juv. Ct. Proc. R. 40.02 (West 2003), and R.I. Gen. Laws §40-11-14 (2004).
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represent his position.  Put simply, a child would not ordinarily ask the Court for a lawyer 
to parrot the guardian ad litem, nor would there be a need for the Court to appoint 
separate counsel in the event of conflict if the child’s views were irrelevant.
The right of the child to choose counsel is also reflected in professional standards 
adopted by the organized bar.  The relevant American Bar Association standards provide 
that:
The court should permit the child to be represented by a retained private 
lawyer if it determines that this lawyer is the child’s independent choice, 
and such counsel should be substituted for the appointed lawyer.  A person 
with a legitimate interest in the child’s welfare may retain private counsel 
for the child and/or pay for such representation. . .77
Similarly, the “Fordham” recommendations, promulgated at the 1992 Fordham 
Conference on the Representation of Children, provide that “the court should permit the 
child to be represented by a retained private lawyer if the court determines that this 
lawyer is the child’s independent choice.”  The “Fordham” standards continue by 
recommending that the court should allow, at the child’s request, the substitution of one 
state-compensated lawyer for another, for good cause . . .”78
In sum, several states, including three of the most populous states in the union 
(California, New York and Illinois), have enacted statutes granting the child the right to 
choose his counsel. Several additional states provide for the appointment of counsel when 
77
 American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers who Represent Children in Abuse and 
Neglect cases, 1996; Standard H-5.  The standard continues by stipulating that court approval is necessary, 
and that such approval should not be granted if the child opposes the lawyer’s representation.
78
 Recommendations of The Conference on Ethical Issues in The Legal Representation of Children 
Recommendation, VIII, C, 2, 3.
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the child so requests, or when there is a conflict between the child’s position and that of 
the guardian ad litem.  In addition, standards adopted by the American Bar Association 
and other groups underscore the basic right of the child to be represented by an attorney 
who she wants, a lawyer who will develop and advocate a position consistent with her 
position. The existence of these provisions constitutes a strong statement in favor of the 
child’s need and right to be considered as an equal party to the proceedings capable, in 
many cases, of entering into a normal attorney-client relationship.
Section 4.  The Child’s Right of Presence and Participation
Children who are involved in protective proceedings may be present in the 
Courthouse and appear before the Court, participate in the proceedings, and attend out-of-
court conferences.  Although the notion of presence and involvement may surprise even 
the most seasoned children’s attorney, there is simply no prohibition – or at least I have 
never seen a statute, rule or case limiting participation generally.79  To the contrary, 
several state statutes specifically prescribe the child’s right to be present in court and 
participate.80  And in those states which afford full party status to the child, the juvenile 
may surely appear and otherwise participate in the proceedings – that’s the essence of 
79
 Limiting the child’s presence for a specific purpose or event is, of course, a different matter.  See, e.g., In 
re Ty L., 218 Wis.2d 834, 581 N.W.2d 595 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) where, in an unpublished opinion, the 
Court held that the emotionally troubled institutionalized child’s presence in court could be precluded by 
the trial judge, and telephone presence substituted; the Court also held that the guardian ad litem could not 
waive the child’s presence.
80
 See e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Ch. 705 5405-5 (West 2004), and Minn. R. Juv. Proc. R. 39.01 (2003), 
which stipulates that a child over the age of 12 may participate.  
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party status.81  Yet, in most states the child’s appearance before the court is a rare event, 
and most children, including older juveniles, are absent from the courtroom itself and are 
hardly ever seen at case meetings or conferences.82
The major exception is California.  The California Code provides that “[a] minor 
who is the subject of a juvenile court hearing . . . is entitled to be present at the hearing,” 
and continues by stipulating that “If the minor is 10 years of age or older and he or she is 
not present at the hearing, the court shall determine whether the minor was properly 
notified of his or her right to attend the hearing.”83  Consequently, many California 
juvenile courthouses are designed to be child friendly, and are equipped with children’s 
areas and furniture.  The children are to be seen and heard.84  The California protocol 
does not mean that children attend every court hearing (though attendance occurs with 
some frequency), but a significant majority of children above the age of 8 or 10 are 
present in the courthouse, where they can discuss the case with their attorney, participate 
at meetings and, when appropriate, appear in the courtroom -- seated next to their lawyer, 
81
 See footnote 54 and 55.
82
 One study found that only 10-18 percent of represented children appeared in court at all; Final Report on 
the Validation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation Through Guardian ad Litem, infra note 8, 
at 6-13, 14.
83
 Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code §13.51, the statutory modification essentially reinforced the California practice of 
child presence and involvement.  In addition to California, there have been tentative measures in a few 
jurisdictions.  For example, the New York City Family Court administration encourages the attendance of 
older children at post-disposition permanency hearings.
84
 For example, the Los Angeles County courthouse, devoted to child protective proceedings, has large 
open children’s areas equipped with children’s sized furnishings.  I have visited the courthouse twice in the 
past few years, and admired the child friendly architecture and furnishings, and the presence of large 
numbers of children.
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as is any other party.  It is a refreshing albeit unique experience to walk through a 
juvenile court and actually see children.
The American Bar Association standards agree with California, stating, simply, 
that “In most circumstances, the child should be present at significant court hearings, 
regardless of whether the child will testify,”85 adding, as a commentary, that “[a] child 
has the right to meaningful participation in the case, which generally includes the child’s 
presence at significant court hearings”.86
A recent development which may encourage child participation is the 
employment of mediation programs to resolve cases prior to formal adjudication.  Since 
2002 the District of Columbia courts have referred every child protective case to 
mediation panels87 and this year New York enacted legislation authorizing mediation88.  
Not surprisingly, California, which utilizes mediation techniques, permits the child’s 
85
 ABA Standards, supra note 77, Standard D-5.  The need for great child participation has also been 
addressed in the New York Bar Association Standards:  “The law guardian should determine whether the 
child should be present in court, and, when appropriate, should determine whether the child should make a 
statement to the court”; Standard C-4, Law Guardian Representation Standards, Part III, Child Protective 
Proceedings, New York State Bar Association, 1996.
86
 Id. Given the prevailing practice of child exclusion, the commentary notes that “It may be necessary to 
obtain a court order or writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to secure the child’s attendance at the 
hearing.”  The possible need to file a writ of habeas corpus for the child to be present at her own protective 
hearing underscores just how far we have to progress before securing a meaningful role for the child in the 
proceedings.
87
 District of Columbia Courts Annual Report, 2004, p. 83.
88
 Family Court Act Section 1018, effective 12/21/05.
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involvement, stipulating that ‘[t]he child has a right to participate in the dependency 
mediation process accompanied by his or her attorney”89.
To a child, mediation is usually a much less awesome or frightening procedure 
than a formal court appearance.  The informality, with sessions conducted at a conference 
table where the participants engage in conversation rather than formal testimony, is more 
child friendly than the courtroom setting.  The growing use of mediation may also have a 
spill-over effect on the courtroom phase. If mediation (at which the child is active) is 
successful, and early reports indicate a very high resolution rate, the child should clearly 
be present at the subsequent court appearance needed to formalize the agreement and 
craft a relevant court order.90  Even where mediation is unsuccessful, the child’s 
involvement (when the child participates) should facilitate a similar involvement when 
the same issues are litigated before the court.
Presence is essential to a realization of the child’s right to participate to the extent 
the youngster may be able.  And there is no policy reason to generally exclude the child, 
with the exception of the very young, and subject to the court’s authority to exclude for a 
specific justifiable reason (such as when forensic experts are testifying or discussing the 
parent’s psychological condition).  Adding to the need for the child to be present, at least 
89
 Rule 1405.5(d)(2)(B) of the California Rules of Court (2004).
90
 In one example California County, Santa Clara, 75 percent of the cases referred for mediation resulted in 
a partial resolution; Journal of the Center for Families, Children and the Courts, Judicial Counsel of 
California, Vol. 5 (2004) at p. 63.  Similarly, the District of Columbia, which refers every case to mediation 
panels, reported a 74 percent mediation settlement rate in 2004; District of Columbia Courts Annual 
Report, 2004, p. 83.
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in the courthouse, is the common practice of negotiating and settling cases (or specific 
issues) in the courthouse at the pre-trial conference or mediation session, or on the day 
the hearing is scheduled.91  The great majority of child protective cases, like most causes 
of action, never reach trial.  Consequently, in most cases the child who is in attendance 
will never hear testimony or see an evidentiary hearing.  Precluding presence and 
participation at the conference table is a great disservice to children, as California has 
found.  Nor should the older child usually be excluded from the courtroom when a 
settlement is placed on the record.  Even if courtroom participation is not appropriate in a 
specific matter, that should not bar the child’s presence in the courthouse (as per 
California, the ABA standard, and in a few other jurisdictions).  The child’s attorney 
could privately discuss proposals and alternatives with the child (that is what the 
attorney-client relationship is all about), solicit the child’s views on the spot, and 
incorporate the young client’s concerns and suggestions.  
Short of live presence in the courtroom, at least limited participation may be 
afforded through the use of in-camera testimony (whereby a child testifies or is 
interviewed confidentially in judicial chambers.  In-camera procedures are routinely 
employed in child custody cases,92 granting the court insight into the child’s position and, 
91
 Jean Koh Peters, observing that the great majority of children’s lawyers attend critical conferences 
without their clients, concludes that the child’s attorney shall “never act or make any statements outside the 
presence of your client that you would not make in front of your client”; Peters, supra note 22 at 60.  That 
is good advice, but it in no way constitutes a substitute for client presence and participation.
92
 Several statutes explicitly permit the practice; see e.g., Ind. Code Ann. §31-17-2-9 (2004), and Revised 
statutes Missouri §452.385 (2004).  The practice has also been long recognized by caselaw; see, e.g., 
Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.3d 230, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842, 247 N.E.2d 659 (1969).
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of at least equal significance, granting the child a forum to express her views as a 
participant.  On the other hand, while not unknown, the use of in-camera testimony in 
child protection proceedings is a very rare event.93
Adding to the dichotomy, in a custody case at least the older child’s wishes must 
be considered by the court when determining the case.  Hence, the court possesses a 
procedural mechanism, in-camera, to determine a substantive rule, consideration of the 
child’s point of view.94  In a child protective case, however, the child’s wishes may not 
be relevant, and the child himself is almost never heard.  The anomalous consequence 
may be illustrated by the following hypothetical.  Suppose Jane’s mother has neglected 
her.  Jane’s grandmother may, in that event, pursue a private child custody action; Jane 
would probably enjoy the right to be heard through an in-camera interview, and her 
expressed wishes must be considered by the court.  But suppose, instead, that the 
government files a child neglect case against Mom which results in the placement of Jane 
in kinship foster care with grandma.  In that event, Jane will not be heard – an in-camera 
would be highly unlikely, and her desires are probably deemed to be irrelevant.  Same 
child, same contestants, same facts, same disposition, but significantly different levels of 
participation.
93
 Two reported cases in which the procedure was used are Cruz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 472 
A.2d 725, 58 Pa. Comwlth. 147 (Commonwealth Ct. Penn. 1984), and Matter of Bernelle P., 59 A.D.2d 
764, 398 N.Y.S.3d 714 (2nd Dept. 1977); the practice is also authorized by court rule in West Virginia; Rule 
8, Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.
94
 Forty-six states plus the District of Columbia require consideration of the child’s wishes in custody 
matters; se 38 Family Law Quarterly, 777 Chart 2 following p. 808 (2005).
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I believe that children should participate at far greater levels than at present, 
whether the case ostensibly involves child custody or child protection (and elements of 
both are often woven into a given case).  That said, bringing the “child protective” 
youngster to the level of the “child custody” youngster would constitute a significant 
improvement.95
Last, assuming the child enjoys the right to choose an attorney or to request the 
substitution of attorneys, as provided in many states (see the previous section), that right 
cannot be intelligently employed unless the child-client sees the lawyer in action.  And, to 
return to the theme which commenced this section, many jurisdictions explicitly permit 
presence and participation, while no jurisdiction prohibits child participation.  In the final 
analysis, the development of a meaningful attorney-client relationship, as advocated in 
this article, is severely compromised, if not unachievable, when the child is barred from 
the forum where his vital interests are determined.96
95
 One reason for the dichotomy between protective and private custody cases may be the involvement of 
the government in child protective cases; the old “parens patriae” or, perhaps, the government knows best 
for children attitude unfortunately persists.
96
 Professor Freeman offers the following cogent observation:
. . . should lawyers adopt the roles of the professors?  And should their roles be conceived 
differently when they are representing children as opposed to adults?  There seems to be 
an assumption that they should, but this, I would suggest, is yet another instance of the 
way we project our reluctance to see children as participants in processes which affect 
them.
Michael Freeman, The Moral Status of Children, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1997), at p. 80.
39
Section 5: What Are the Child’s Legal Interests?
It need hardly be said that the child maintains a legally cognizable interest in a 
child protective proceeding.97  That is the presumptive reason the youngster is afforded 
representation, whether by counsel, a guardian ad litem, or both.  That is also the 
rationale for granting the child party status, or at least the attributes of party status, 
whether de jure or de facto.98  In other words, the minor who is allegedly abused or 
neglected is viewed as possessing a separate independent interest in the litigation.  Hence 
she can present evidence, argue (via an attorney or guardian), seek interim or permanent 
relief, and when necessary, appeal to a higher tribunal. 
But, what, precisely, are those interests?  The answer may not always be clear.  Of 
perhaps greater significance, little has been written and, in fact, the question itself has 
been largely subsumed in the debate over whether counsel should represent the child’s 
wishes or the child’s best interests.99  Yet, the child’s legal interests must be identified 
before counsel can frame a position or develop a strategy to attain a goal.100  This section 
97
 Once upon a time that was not considered to be so; see page 6.  But the clear twenty-first century 
consensus is that the child has an independent legal interest in the action.
98
 See page 6.
99
 See Part III.
100
 In most legal actions the legal interests of a specific party is so evident that we don’t think of the issue.  
For example, the legal interest of a plaintiff in a tort action is to be made whole by recouping monetary 
damages (of course the defendant’s interest is apposite).  In a divorce action the legal interest for the 
plaintiff is to obtain a divorce, while subsidiary legal issues flow from the divorce, such as the right to 
marital property, maintenance, etc.  However, in a child protective case the interests of the child are less 
clear or, perhaps more accurately, have not been given clear legal expression.
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will summarize those specific legal interests which the child may assert within the child 
protective proceeding framework.
The first interest, one which is readily apparent, is protection. After all, that is the 
reason we call the action a “child protective” proceeding. Assuming the existence of 
abuse, neglect, or dependency, the child has a cognizable legal right to be protected.  
Further, virtually every child who has been abused or severely neglected wants protection 
– no one wishes to endure continued abuse or to be consistently deprived of basic needs 
such as nourishment or medical services.101  The extent and form of protection which the 
child desires may vary.  Child A may want to be placed outside her home, perhaps with a 
relative, while in the same situation Child B may want to remain home with the parent 
supervised or with home based services.  And the applicable statutes authorize a wide 
range of protective measures which the child may assert.  In California, for example, 
“[i]n all cases in which a minor is adjudged a dependent child . . . the court may limit the 
control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent or guardian and shall by its 
order clearly and specifically set forth all those limitations . . .  The limitations may not 
exceed those necessary to protect the child.”102  The Uniform Juvenile Court Act 
authorizes a range of “. . . orders of disposition best suited to the protection and physical, 
101
 If a person, adult or child, actually desires to be abused or be deprived of basic needs, the person’s 
competency is seriously questioned.  That said, the relatively benign forms of neglect, such as inadequate 
supervision or the lack of an acceptably maintained home, may of course not rise to the level where the 
child would necessarily want remediation (and a few children may, irrationally, resist protection from 
serious abuse).
102
 Cal. Wel. & Instit. Code, §361(a) (2005).
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mental, and moral welfare of the child”.103  Every state provides, as one possible remedy, 
that the child remain at home with the parents placed under supervision,104 and many 
specifically provide for the issuance of orders of protection enjoining the parent or other 
person responsible from committing detrimental acts against the child.105  Needless to 
say, every state also permits placement outside the home when necessary to protect the 
child.  The child’s legal interest in protection may take many forms, and the minor, 
through counsel, may advocate and argue from a large array of protective measures.
Even assuming that the specific child may be adequately protected only though 
placement outside the home, the statutory parameters are extremely broad.  The child 
may be placed with a relative in an arrangement deemed “kinship” care.106  For that 
matter, in many states the child may be placed “in the custody of a relative or other 
suitable person”107, an extraordinary open ended prescription which could encompass a 
distant relative, family friend, or neighbor.  The Court may even specify the geographic 
location; for example, in California the placement should “. . . be as near the child’s home 
as possible, unless it is not in the interest of the child”108.  These provisions provide 
additional scope for the child and her counsel (for example, the child may wish to be 
placed with Aunt Mary rather than with a grandparent or a stranger).  In addition, the 
103
 Uniform Juvenile Court Act §30 (1968).
104
 See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §1054 (McKinney’s 2004).  
105
 See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §1-56 (McKinney’s 2004).
106
 See, e.g., Cal. Wel. & Instit. Code §361.2 (2003).
107
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §1055(a) (McKinney’s 2004).
108
 Cal. Wel. & Instit. Code, §362.2 (2003).
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duration of the initial placement may vary.  From the child’s perspective, a four month 
initial placement while Mom attempts to get her act together may be preferable to a one 
year placement.109
Second, the child has a legal interest in preserving her family’s integrity and 
continuing her relationship with her family, including parents, siblings, grandparents and 
possibly other relatives.110  And that interest is not inconsistent with the right to safety 
and protection.  Both may be achieved in a given case by designing a non-placement 
disposition.  But even if the child is placed outside his home, he maintains the legal right 
to visitation with his parents and siblings.111  Visitation can be maximized (even when 
supervision is needed), siblings can often be placed in the same foster home, and a parent 
can be involved in her child’s life, including education and medical services, when 
custody is transferred, at lease temporarily, to a child care agency.  Most placed children 
want to maintain a close relationship with their parents, and the attorney working with the 
child maintains the ability to ensure the implementation of those rights.
Whether placed or not, and regardless of any other Court directives, the child is 
also legally entitled to a wide range of appropriate medical, psychological, social and 
109
 See, e.g., Cal. Wel. & Instit. Code, §364(d), which requires that the court order’s duration be set at “not 
more than six months from the time of the hearing”.
110
 See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship Number T97036005, 358 Md. 1, 746 A.2d 379, 387, supra note 
47, where the court concluded that the child possesses “. . . an interest in maintaining the integrity of the 
family unit and in having a relationship with his or her biological parents.”
111
 See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to Diana P., 279 Wis.2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344 (2000), In 
re C.R., 364 N.J. Super. 263, 835 A.2d 340 (2003), and In re Clifton B., 81 Cal. App. 4th 415, 96 Cal. 
Rptr.2d 278 (2000).
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educational services.112  A partial list includes medical examinations and treatment, 
counseling, psychological diagnosis, homemaker services, and special educational 
services.  The specifics vary from state to state, but the principle is, today, embedded in 
child protective laws.  Similarly, the parent is usually legally entitled to rehabilitation 
services – and it may well be in the child’s interests to advocate court ordered services for 
his parent, thereby improving the home environment when the child is not removed, or 
enhancing the possibility of reunification when the child has been placed.  The 
introduction of a court ordered homemaker into the household, for example, often 
redounds to the immediate benefit of the minor.113
An additional albeit easily overlooked interest is autonomy.  Every person has the 
right to be left alone and is entitled to individual privacy.  Children who are enmeshed in 
child protective cases are too often subject to multiple invasive measures, ranging from 
serial interviews involving their innermost thoughts organized by caseworkers, 
psychologists, and social workers, to physical examinations to disclosure of the child’s 
mental and psychological records.  A major, and non-controversial, responsibility of 
counsel is to articulate and protect the child’s autonomy rights by, for example, 
112
 See, e.g., K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990), and C.R.S.A. 526-6-102 
(Colorado).
113
 For purposes of this section, the discussion and citations pertain to abuse, neglect or dependency cases.  
A similar analysis could be outlined for termination of parental rights proceedings, though the dispositional 
options are usually more limited.
44
requesting court protective orders barring sequential interviews, or by seeking to quash a 
subpoena for the child’s confidential or privileged therapy records.114
In summary, the child possesses an impressive array of independent legal 
interests, or rights which may be developed, advocated, and argued by the child’s 
attorney.  And those rights exist regardless of the specific representation model.  One 
does not have to engage in a wooden “best interests” vs. “child’s wishes” analysis to 
determine whether the attorney should press for needed services (as well as seek 
supporting forensic reports and testimony) – or to conclude that whenever possible the 
child should be consulted or, better, serve as an active participant.  Nor is there likely to 
develop an attorney-client conflict concerning social services, education, protection of the 
child’s autonomy, or visitation.  The key, it seems to me, is an understanding of the 
myriad and sometimes complex child’s legal rights, coupled with a holistic approach with 
the child in securing and enforcing those rights.115
114
 See, e.g., Matter of Kathleen Quigley Berg and Eugene Berg, 2005  (N.H. Sup. Ct. 2005), where the 
court held that the child’s therapy records could not be disclosed in a custody case based on the fact that the 
relationship between child and therapist was privileged and the child did not waive the privilege.
115
 I am indebted to Jean Koh Peters, supra note ___, who has pioneered in developing a holistic approach 
to child representation.
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PART III.  THE ROLE OF CHILD’S COUNSEL
For over forty years the role and responsibilities of the attorney who represents a 
child in a protective proceeding have been hotly debated.116  The contestants have been 
the “best interests of the child” school, arguing that counsel should independently 
determine and advocate the child’s best interests regardless of the child’s wishes 
(assuming the child has a specific view), and the “child’s wishes” school, which bases its 
argument on the premise that counsel is obligated to advocate the child’s wishes unless 
the child is very young or otherwise impaired.  Attempting to bridge the divide, a 
legislature or court has on occasion prescribed the contradictory formula of advocating 
both “best interest” and “wishes”.117
This Part will outline the current state of the “controversy”, without attempting an 
exhaustive players-list or history.  The discussion commences by surveying legislation, 
continues by explaining the position of the organized bar and academics, and concludes 
with a synopsis of twenty-first century caselaw.  In general, legislators have persistently 
mandated that the attorney adhere to a “best interests” standard, while the organized bar 
and academics have pushed the other way, i.e. toward either a “child’s wishes” lawyering 
model or, more recently, a conventional or “adult” attorney-client model.  For their part, 
the judiciary appears to be hopelessly conflicted concerning the role of child’s counsel.
116
 See, for example, the seminal 1996 Special Fordham Law Review issue entitled “Proceedings of the 
Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, Vol. LXIV, pp. 1279-2132 (March 
1996).  Similar controversy has shaped the representation of children in child custody cases.
117
 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78-3A-912(8)(a) (2005) and Ark. Code Ann. §9-27-316(5)(B) (2005).
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In a subsequent section118 I shall discuss why I believe the “best interests” vs. 
“wishes” equation is misleading, if not false, and argue for a more sophisticated albeit 
complicated relationship between the child-client and the attorney.  For now, my intent is 
to illustrate the inconsistencies and deficiencies of the present approaches.
Section 1.  The Legislatures Speak
The granddaddy statute, New York’s 1962 Act, provided for counsel “. . . to help 
protect their [the children’s] interests and to help them express their wishes to the 
court”.119  After forty years, that prescription remains in effect.  On the face of it, there is 
nothing extraordinary about the language.  Clients, whether age eight or age eighty, look 
to lawyers to help protect their interests, and, surely, to articulate their position.  Perhaps 
tellingly, the statute does not even include the phrase “best interests”, much less mandate 
that counsel advocates “best interests”.  (“Interests” are not synonymous with “best 
interests” – for example, a landowner may pursue a legally recognized interest to evict a 
viable tenant even when market conditions preclude obtaining a new tenant, i.e., the 
landlord’s “best interests” would be to forgo the right of eviction.)  Further, the statute 
also stipulates that children “. . . should be represented by counsel of their own choosing 
or by law guardians.”120  For reasons that have been noted, a child is unlikely to choose 
118Part IV, Section 1.
119
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §241 (1962).
120
 Ibid.
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counsel who may compromise her position.121  The grandfather statute is best described 
as ambivalent, and, as will be outlined in Section “3”, the New York courts have 
continuously reflected the legislative ambivalence during the statute’s forty year lifespan.
Enacting CAPTA in 1974, the United States Congress opted for a guardian ad 
litem model, stipulating that the states must appoint a guardian ad litem or an individual 
who fulfills the guardian ad litem role, language which strongly promoted the “best 
interests” aspect of child representation.122  As states gradually replaced or supplemented 
lay guardian ad litems (such as CASA volunteers) with attorneys (a progression not yet 
complete) the “best interests” paradigm was codified.  And state legislators have 
continued to embrace the concept that counsel for the child should advocate “best 
interests”, regardless of the child’s age or maturity.
Surprisingly, the legislative “best interests” approach has been strengthened in 
recent years.  For example, in 1995 Montana amended its appointment statute by 
changing the phrase “the court may appoint an attorney” to “the court may appoint a 
guardian ad litem”123, adding that the guardian ad litem may be an attorney.  The 
Montana Supreme Court subsequently held that “. . . the [amended] statute contemplates 
that a guardian ad litem has a unique role to protect the interests of the child . . .[t]his role 
is different from the traditional role played by attorneys.  We hold that when a court 
121
 See Part II, Section 3.
122
 Federal Child Abuse and Treatment Protection Act, supra note 19, §1340.14(g).
123
 Montana Code Ann. §40-4-205(1) (2004).    
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appoints a guardian ad litem [which it is required to do], the guardian is not to act as an 
attorney.”124  And in 1999 California amended it’s relevant provision by adding the 
caveat “counsel for the child shall not advocate for the return of the child if, to the best of 
his or her knowledge, that return conflicts with the protection and safety of the child”.125
The phrase could be construed as an artful compromise between “best interests” and 
straight advocacy, but it retains the subjective “best interest” baggage.  Further, the return 
of the child frequently raises protection issues – as does the placement of the child.  It’s 
often a difficult choice involving a balance of rights.  And just how is the lawyer 
supposed to balance the child’s physical safety with the child’s emotional protection 
(removal of the child carries an emotional and psychological price)?
Overall, most states provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.126  Of 
perhaps greater significance, 35 states explicitly stipulate that the child’s representative, 
attorney or lay, shall advocate the child’s “best interests”.127  To date, there is no 
indication that the states will do anything but continue to legislate that position.  At the 
legislative level the battle has seemingly been won by the “best interests” school.
However, the statutes are not always consistent.  A few states, such as Wisconsin, 
are in one sense statutorily pristine, stipulating that the attorney shall not consider or be 
124
 Jacobsen v. Thomas, 323 Mont. 183,100 P.3d 106 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 2004).
125
 Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code §317.
126
 Katherine Hunt Federle in her 2000 article, supra note _____ at page 425 found that 41 of the 50 states 
provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, including those which stipulate that the guardian ad 
litem must be an attorney.
127
 Jean Koh Peters, supra note 22, at pp. 30-32.  One example is Colorado, see Colo. Rev. Stat. §19-3-
602(3) (West 2004).
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bound by the child’s wishes.128  Other statutes provide that counsel may consider the 
child’s wishes when determining best interests,129 or require the attorney to apprise the 
court of the child’s wishes130, fostering a “hybrid” model of inherent inconsistencies.  
Still other states are silent regarding the child’s wishes.
“Best interests” is of course a subjective standard, one dependent on the particular 
attorney’s background and views.  It is also a balancing standard in which different 
criteria must be weighed.  For example, the child’s right to and need for protection may 
support a “best interests” placement, while the same child’s emotional and psychological 
need for family integrity may support the “best interests” goal of non-removal.  The 
Solomanic determination of “best interests” frequently bedevils the judges who must 
ultimately determine the issue, with or without the independent determination of counsel 
for the child.
Several jurisdictions have enacted yet additional conflicts.  In those states which 
statutorily stipulate that the child may choose counsel, yet adhere to a “best interests” 
model, the attorney may be placed in an untenable position – the child ordinarily wants a 
lawyer who advocates his position, not one who disregards his position in favor of 
counsel’s subjective “best interests” analysis.131  If the child is entitled to counsel as a 
constitutional matter, as several courts have held, the mandate of effective representation 
128
 Ibid.
129
 See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 22 §4005(1)(F) (West 2004), and S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-122(5) (2004).
130
 Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code §317(e) (2005).
131
 See Part II, Section 3.
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surely implies a relationship different than that of guardian ad litem, and in fact requires a 
strong attorney-client relationship.132  Further, if the child is a party to the proceedings, a 
principal that has earned wide recognition,133 the guardian ad litem model, as legislated at 
the Federal and state levels, becomes extremely strained, if not untenable.
Nevertheless, state legislators have remained steadfast (as has CAPTA) in 
prescribing the “best interests” standard for counsel.  The organized bar and academy are 
another matter.
Section 2.  The Organized Bar and the Academy
Viewed as a whole, the thinking of scholars, as reflected in law reviews, has 
evolved significantly since the inception of legal counsel for children.  Writing shortly 
after New York enacted the first state statute in 1962, Jacob Isaacs, one of the Act’s 
architects, stressed a decidedly “best interests” role:
It is in the neglect proceeding that his [the attorney’s] role as a guardian 
rather than as an advocate becomes predominant.  He is not called upon to 
defend but rather to ascertain where the best interests of his ward lie and to 
exert his efforts to secure the disposition which in his view would best 
serve those interests.  The ultimate decisions he will be called upon to 
make will be basically non-legal in character . . . 134
132
 See Part I, Section 3.
133
 See Part II, Section 2.
134
 Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 Buffalo 
Law Rev. 501 at 519 (1963).  Isaacs did advocate a more adversarial or lawyer-client approach in juvenile 
delinquency cases.
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As has been noted, the New York Act does not even mention “best interests”;135 Isaacs 
engrafted that standard upon the statutory language, perhaps unsure of the ramifications 
of providing the then novel and unprecedented gift of counsel to children.
The “best interests” theme was reinforced one decade later by Brian Fraser, one of 
the contributors to CAPTA.  Shortly after CAPTA’s enactment, Fraser published an 
article which strongly endorsed the guardian ad litem model of representation, i.e. the 
attorney role envisioned by Congress.136
The tide began to turn in 1983 when Professor Sarah Ramsey advocated a largely 
child’s wishes approach and one year later Professor Martin Guggenheim published an 
article advocating a strong attorney-client role, one dictated by the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility that guides every lawyer representing a client, old or young, competent or 
impaired.137  Guggenheim’s approach became widely accepted in the academy and 
ultimately influenced the organized bar.
The attorney-client theme has been reinforced in several subsequent articles.138
Viewing the academic position in the late 1990’s, Jean Koh Peters concluded that “Very 
few authors currently suggest that a teenage child, for instance, should be represented in 
135
 Fam. Ct. Act §241, see supra note 16.
136
 Brian Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian ad Litem, 
13 Cal. W.C. Rev. 16 (1976).
137
 Sarah Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-
Making Capacity 17 Fam. L.Q. 287 (1983); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented But Not 
Heard:  Reflections on Legal Representation of Children, 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 76 (1984).
138
 See, for example, Robert H. Mnookin, In the Interests of Children: Law Reform and Public Policy, 
(1985), where Professor Mnookin criticized heavily the “best interests” model of representation.
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the mode espoused by the early writers or the guardian ad litem.  Thus from Ramsey on, 
the vast majority of the literature has resoundingly embraced the traditional lawyering 
role for children above a certain age.” 139  As will be discussed later, the traditional role is 
not synonymous with simply espousing the child’s wishes.140  It’s a lot more 
complicated.  There are also obvious difficulties in adhering to a strict attorney-client role 
when representing the very young child (as Peters recognized) or the psychologically 
impaired child (and scholars differ concerning the role of the lawyer in those situations; 
see page ____).  Nevertheless, the academy is today strongly against the “best interests” 
paradigm, and in favor of the more traditional or, if you will, an “adult” representation 
model, with the child’s wishes as the major or predominant factor.
The boldest assertion of a traditional attorney-client relationship is found in the 
American Bar Association Standards for Child Protective Cases.  The standards 
commence by defining the terms “child-attorney” and “guardian ad litem”;  “the term 
‘child-attorney’ means a lawyer who provides legal services for a child and who serves 
the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation to the 
child as is due an adult client”141, while “[a] lawyer appointed as ‘guardian ad litem’ for a 
child is an officer of the court appointed to protect the child’s interests without being 
139
 Jean Koh Peters supra note 22 at 39.  The “traditional role” view is of course not universally held.  See 
e.g., Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct 
Lawyer Roles Are Required, 34 Fam. Law Quarterly 441 (2000).  As the title suggests, Duquette would add 
“best interests” and “wishes” models.
140
 See Part III,  Section 3, p. 55.
141
 ABA Standards supra note 77, Standard A-1.
53
bound by the child’s expressed preferences.”142  However, the attorney guardian ad 
litem’s standing is subsequently severely truncated, if not superceded, by the following 
standard:  “If a lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem determines that there is a conflict 
caused by performing both roles of guardian ad litem and child’s attorney, the lawyer 
should continue to perform as the child’s attorney and withdraw as guardian ad litem.”143
Any doubt that the “child’s attorney” role and empowerment differs from a lawyer 
representing an adult is quickly dispelled by the definitional section’s commentary:  “To 
ensure that the child’s independent voice is heard, the child’s attorney must advocate the 
child’s articulated position”.144  And, for good measure, the commentary to the guardian 
ad litem definition cautions that “these standards, however, express a clear preference for 
the appointment as the ‘child’s attorney’”.
When representing any child other than the very young there is always a potential 
conflict between the role of child’s attorney and guardian ad litem, and a good possibility 
that the potential conflict will ripen into an actual one.  The older child’s position and 
preferences may or may not be similar to the independent position of the guardian ad 
litem, but is unlikely to be identical.145  For example, the child may not want to remain in 
142
 Id., Standard A-2.
143
 Id., Standard B-2.
144 Commentary to Standard A-1.  The commentary also states that “In all but the exceptional case, such as 
with a preverbal child, the child’s attorney will maintain this traditional relationship with the child/client”.
145
 One study found that approximately 31 percent of all children represented in protective proceedings are 
over the age of 13; Final Report on the Validation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation 
Through Guardian ad Litem, U.S.  Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1990, Table 4.4-1.  Ergo, the large 
majority of children are capable of assisting their attorney.
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the parental home, but may want placement with a person the attorney believes to be less 
suitable than an alternative placement.  Further, as guardian ad litem the attorney can’t 
protect the child’s confidential statements.  Although the ABA standards permit a 
guardian ad litem role for attorneys representing the very young, they effectively 
preclude the guardian ad litem representation of most other children.  Completing the 
progression, the standards stipulate that “the child’s attorney should represent the child’s 
expressed preferences and follow the child’s direction throughout the course of 
litigation.”146  So much for “best interests”.147  The American Bar Association standards 
were subsequently adopted, with minor revisions, by the National Association of Counsel 
for Children.148
The Fordham Conference recommendations, reflecting a consensus by 
representatives of the Bar and Academia, similarly take a strong lawyer qua lawyer 
position and, taking the ABA position to its logical conclusion, prohibit the attorney from 
ever acting as a guardian ad litem.  “The lawyer should assume the obligations of a 
lawyer, regardless of how the lawyer’s role is labeled, be it as guardian ad litem, attorney 
ad litem, law guardian or other.  The lawyer should not serve as the child’s guardian ad 
litem or in another role insofar as the role includes responsibilities inconsistent with those 
146
 Id., Standard B-4.
147
 Wisely, the ABA Standards never mention the child’s “wishes”, and instead refer to the child’s 
“preferences” or “position”.
148
 National Association of Counsel for Children, Revised Version of ABA Standards of Practice For 
Lawyers who Represent Children and Abuse and Neglect Cases (1999).
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of a lawyer for the child”.149  In addition, the Fordham Conference came down heavily 
against the principle that the attorney determine and advocate the child’s “best interests”:  
“Although other issues remain unresolved, the profession has rendered a consensus that 
lawyers for children currently exercise too much discretion in making decisions on behalf 
of their clients including  ‘best interests’ determinations.”150
The philosophy of the legal profession or, more accurately, the organized bar and 
academy, is accordingly diametrically opposite that of legislators, state and federal.  The 
situation resembles a lengthy tug of war in which neither side prevails.  The courts have 
been caught in the middle, as evidenced by the breadth of caselaw.
Section 3.  The Contemporary Caselaw
The judiciary has been wrestling with the role of the child’s counsel since the first 
series of cases dating from the early circa 1960’s statutes and the 1974 CAPTA.  The by 
now extensive caselaw has largely reflected the relevant statutory language, that is to say 
has applied a “best interests” model with the attorney acting as a guardian ad litem 
(assuming the state requires the appointment of legal counsel). But, perhaps surprisingly, 
the caselaw is far from uniform.  Several courts have resisted the legislative prescription, 
while others have tried to posit their decisions in both camps, precipitating inconsistent 
149 Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in The Legal Representation of Children, supra 
note 78, Recommendation I.  The recommendations continue by stating that “. . . the lawyer may request 
appointment of a separate guardian ad litem and continue to represent the child’s expressed preference, 
unless the child’s  expressed preference, unless the child’s expressed position is prohibited by law or 
without any factual foundation”; Recommendation B-4(3).
150
 Id., Recommendation IV.B.1.
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and sometimes conflicting opinions.  This section will, by way of illustration, present a 
sample of mostly twenty-first century cases.
A.  Cases Applying a “Best Interests” or Guardian Ad Litem Model
The prevalent theme has been “best interests”.  The West Virginia Supreme 
Court, for example, has opined that “. . . in the case of a child, justice is clearly best 
served by requiring that counsel and the court exercise their respective best judgment in 
all aspects of the case, and that the court have the benefit of counsel’s candid and 
independent assistance in ascertaining the best interests of that child.”151  The Mississippi 
Supreme Court has held that counsel, acting as guardian ad litem, should “. . . make an 
independent evaluation of what constitutes the best interests of the children” and submit a 
written report to the court.152  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has opined that 
attorney for the child should function “. . . as an arm of the court, investigating the facts 
bearing on parental rights and responsibilities and reporting her findings and 
recommendations to the court.”153  The Colorado Court of Appeals has concluded that an 
attorney “represents the best interests of the child” and . . . “cannot represent a child’s 
views without question”.154
151 State et rel. Jeanne U. v. G. Canady Jr., 210 W. Va. 88, 554 S.E.3d 121, 130 (2001), citing to In re 
Lindsey C., 196 W.Va. 395, 473 S.E.2d 110 (1995).
152 D.J.L. v. Bolivar Co. Dept. of Human Services, 824 So.2d 617, 623 (2002); see also Jacobsen v. 
Thomas, supra note 124.
153 Mary-Gay Kennedy v. State of Maine, 730 A.2d 1252, 1257 (1999). 
154 In re the Custody of C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479, 482 (Colo. Ct. of App., Div. III 2001).
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In several cases the courts, while applying the statutory “best interests” formula, 
have at least recognized the conflict.  In Ohio, the court opined that “[b]ecause a guardian 
ad litem has a duty to recommend what is in the best interests of the child, and an 
attorney has a duty to zealously represent his client, it is easy to see that a conflict could 
arise any time a child’s desire is not what he deemed in his ‘best interests”, but went on 
to find no conflict in the particular case.155  In another Ohio case, the same attorney 
represented the child in a dependency case and in an unrelated juvenile delinquency case.  
Viewing his role as a guardian ad litem, the attorney, without investigation or much 
discussion with his client, had the child plead guilty to rape, prompting the court to 
reverse; “. . .counsel’s failure to investigate or raise these issues further illustrates how 
his role in determining Jon’s best interest, i.e. to obtain necessary counseling, and his 
duty to zealously represent his client were in conflict”.156  The case illustrates the danger 
of the “best interests” model infecting other areas of children’s representation, such as 
delinquency, where it is totally untenable, as well as the dilemmas in treating the same 
child differently when he is involved in multiple proceedings (the same child received a 
“real” lawyer for the delinquency charge, but a “best interests” lawyer for the child 
protective charge).
B.  Cases which held that the Attorney Must Advocate the Child’s Position
155 In re Devonte Griffin, ____, 2001 WL 43106 (Court of Appeals of Ohio, 2nd Dist. 2001.
156 In re Jonathan L. Slusher, 2002 WL 971765 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 2002).
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A significant number of courts have held that counsel for the child is bound by the 
traditional attorney-client rules and must act accordingly, i.e. assume the role of advocate 
for the child’s interests and position rather than the attorney’s “best interests” beliefs.  A 
Connecticut appellate court, quoting earlier cases, has held that “The purpose of 
appointing counsel for a minor child . . . is to ensure independent representation of the 
child’s interests . . . [w]e conclude that such representation is . . . the type of 
representation enjoyed by unimpaired adults . . . the attorney for the child is just that, an 
attorney, arguing on behalf of his or her client, based on the evidence in the case and the 
applicable law.”157  A New Jersey appellate court has held that the role of counsel in an 
abuse, neglect or termination of parental rights case is one of advocate for the child, and 
concluded their opinion with the following observation:
During oral argument, one of the law guardians remarked that the wishes 
of children are dreams.  True. But the judge entrusted with these difficult 
and often heart-rendering decisions must be advised of a child’s wishes if 
justice is to be done.  Law guardians are obliged to make the wishes of 
their clients known, to make recommendations as to how a child client’s 
desires may be best accomplished, to express any concerns regarding the 
child’s safety or well-being and in a proper case to suggest the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem.158
In a similar vein, a Maryland Appeals Court concluded that:
157 Sherman v. Sherman, 72 Conn. App. 193, 804 A.3d 983, 989 (App. Ct. of Conn. 2002), quoting in part 
Schult v.Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 778, 699 A.2d 134 (1997) and Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 436, 717 
A.2d 676 (1998).  Sherman was a child custody case, but the reasoning is applicable to child protective 
proceedings.  See also In re Care and Protection of Georgette, 439 Mass. 28, 785 N.E.2d 356 (2003) where 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that counsel is obligated to follow the normal attorney-
client relationship unless the child is incapable of verbalizing a preference or her preference places the 
child at risk of substantial harm.
158 Division of Youth and Family Services v. Robert M., 347 N.J. Super. 44, 788 A.2d 888, 905 (Sup. Ct. 
N.J. App. Div. 2002).
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. . . due process requires that Justus be given the opportunity to be heard in 
a meaningful way, that is, by presentation of evidence on the question of 
whether the termination of his parent-child relationship with George W. is 
in his best interests.  At age twelve, Justus is old enough to understand the 
nature of the guardianship proceeding and its effect on him, to have 
formed considered views about it, and to express those views . . . He 
constitutionally was entitled to an opportunity to be heard on the question 
of whether the guardianship would be in his best interest, even though he 
was not entitled to consent to it.  The Court [below] erred in denying 
Justus the process to which he was due.159
Last, for purposes of this brief outline, a recent California case addressed an 
attorney conflict situation in a permanency planning case involving multiple siblings.  
Three of the seven siblings did not wish to be adopted, while four siblings either desired 
adoption or were too young to form firm opinions.  The Court of Appeals, holding that 
the differing children’s opinions required the appointment of different attorneys to 
advocate their positions, reversed the trial court determination that one attorney could 
represent the entire brood.160
C.  The “Conflict” Cases
Reflecting the not unusual “duality” statute, whereby counsel is supposed to 
represent the child’s “best interests” while simultaneously advocate or at least express the 
159 In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z97003, 127 MD. App. 33, 731 A.2d 467, 480-489 (Ct. of Special 
Appeals MD. 1999).  See also Matter of Williams, _________ (Ct. Appeals Ohio 11th District 2002) where 
an Ohio Appellate Court held that trial court should have investigated whether a six year old should be 
assigned counsel to represent his interest and wishes, giving “due regard” to the child’s maturity and 
understanding of the proceedings.
160 Carroll v. The Superior Court of San Diego County, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 124 Ca. Rptr.2d 891 (Ct. 
Appeal Cal. 4th Dist. 2002).
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child’s wishes,161 several courts have determined that the attorney must indeed perform 
conflicting roles.  One recent illustration is In the Matter of Esperanza M.,162where the 
New Mexico Court commented that the applicable statute “. . . signifies a guardian ad 
litem’s dual role of representing the child’s best interests, while also presenting the 
child’s position to the court. . . .”,163 adding, as the Court’s imprimatur, “[w]e commend 
the appellate guardian ad litem for representing in the answer brief what she perceived to 
be the position that was in the best interests of E.M., while still advancing the child’s 
contrary position.”164  Speaking out of both sides of one’s mouth is not, to say the least, 
the customary practice of an attorney.  Taking two contrary positions belittles, if not 
totally negates, both.165
Appellate courts within the same state are not necessarily consistent in their 
approach to the question of counsel’s role.  Two New York cases decided in the same 
year, 2000, are a good example of that phenomenon.  In one, the Court affirmed a 
determination where counsel advocated what he perceived as the eleven year old child’s 
“best interests” to the exclusion of the child’s wishes, concluding that “. . . we found that 
the law guardian did not act improperly by advocating a position that he believed to be in 
161
 See, e.g., Me Rev. Stat. Tit. 22 §4005(b)(e) (2004).
162
 124 N.M. 735, 955 P.2d 204 (Ct. Appeals N.M. 1998).
163
 955 P.2d 204, 212.
164
 Ibid.
165
 In an attempt to avoid conflicting roles a Maryland court has held in a custody case that the court should 
clearly order the child’s attorney to fulfill a specific role, be that as guardian ad litem or attorney for the 
child; Fox v. Wills, 151 Md. App. 31, 822 A.2d 1289 (Ct. Spec. Appeals Md. 2003).
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his client’s best interest”.166  But in another case, a different appellate court reversed a 
case where the attorney assumed a straight guardian ad litem role and failed to advocate 
the child’s wishes.167  Adding to the confusion, a third appellate panel held, but one year 
later, that an attorney for the child is the same as an attorney for any other party, and 
hence should properly advocate the position and wishes of the child.168
Last, in terms of the inherent inconsistency of the “best interests” model, is the 
intriguing Illinois case of In re Rose Lee Ann L. v. Lisa Ann Ramos.169  An attorney 
represented two children (in separate cases) who had been placed several years earlier, as 
a result of child protective proceeding.  Counsel had continuously represented the 
youngsters throughout the placement period, a usual event given the continuing 
jurisdiction of the court and the need for periodic reviews and extensions.  Subsequently, 
the children, while still in placement, entered into a romantic relationship with each other 
which produced a baby.  The state quickly commenced a child protective proceeding 
against the children/parents.  The trial court assigned the lawyer who had previously 
represented the youngsters to the new case, an event which created a dilemma for 
counsel.  Illinois follows a strict “best interests” model of child representation, with the 
attorney designated as guardian ad litem.  Hence, as attorney for the children now turned 
parents, counsel was obligated to advocate what he perceived as their “best interests”; as 
166 Carballeira v. Shumway, 273 A.d.2d 753, 756, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149 (3rd Dept. 2000).
167 Albanese v. Lee, 272 A.D.2d 81, 707 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dept. 2000).
168 Rueckert v. Reilly, 282 A.D.2d 608, 723 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2nd Dept. 2001).
169
 307 Ill. App.3d 907, 718 N.E.2d 623 (1999).
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perceived by counsel, “best interests” was the removal and placement of the infant.  To 
be precise, counsel concluded that it was in the parents’ “best interest” to relinquish 
custody of the child (it may sound confusing, but the child/client had turned into the 
parent/client).  On the other hand, a parent is entitled to a “real” attorney (rather than a 
guardian ad litem), one who advocates his position and attempts to achieve his goal 
which, in this case, was to raise the child.  Both parents shared that goal, with the intent 
of raising the child together.
Faced with the obvious dilemma, counsel posed a series of questions to the trial 
court.  In reply, the court directed the attorney to treat the children/parents as parents, i.e. 
assume the traditional attorney-client relationship in lieu of the guardian ad litem 
relationship.  At that point, counsel moved to withdraw from the case and have substitute 
counsel assigned.  The trial court denied the motion, a decision which was reversed on 
appeal.  Ergo, the children/parents were entitled to traditional representation, which the 
original attorney could not provide.
I suppose one lesson of Rose Lee Ann L. is that if the child wants or needs a 
lawyer-advocate rather than a “best interests” lawyer, he or she should become a parent.  
Or, by becoming pregnant or fathering a child the person magically obtains the maturity 
and competence to dispense with a guardian lawyer.170  At its core, the case illustrates the 
170
 Similarly, the child who allegedly commits a crime is entitled to a “real” lawyer, rather than a guardian 
ad litem replica; see, e.g. In re Johnston, 755 N.E.2d 457 (Ct. Appeals Ohio, 2001).  See also Joanne B., 94 
P.3d 783 (N.M. 2004) for a discussion of the inherent conflicts when the same attorney represents the same 
child, in this case 14 years of age, in child protective case, where the attorney is under a “best interests” 
mandate, and in a juvenile delinquency case, where the attorney must be a zealous advocate.
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absurdities of treating the child, or at least the child who is of sufficient age to conceive, 
as a person who cannot enter into an attorney-client relationship, or one who does not 
merit recognition as a real party to the proceedings.171
Every case discussed in this section has been decided in the past five years.  A 
similar pattern of inconsistencies and ambiguities would emerge if the writer researched 
any half decade since the enactment of CAPTA.  There is surely a better way to meet the 
legal needs and interests of children.
171
 Approximately one-third of all children represented in child protective proceedings are over the age of 
13; see footnote ______.
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PART IV: TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM
Section 1.  The Problems with “Best Interests” – and with “Child’s Wishes”
This part will attempt to construct a different approach for representing children 
in protective proceedings.  The model is not entirely new, is largely consistent with the 
American Bar Association Standards,172 and incorporates the thinking of several incisive 
commentators, including Jean Koh Peters, Martin Guggenheim, and Robert Mnookin.  It 
builds upon the earlier points of this article, including the child’s specific legal interests 
in the litigation, the right to representation, the child’s “party” status, and her right to be 
present and participate.  However, before outlining the approach it may be helpful to 
critique the existing prevalent models – “best interests” versus the “wishes” of the child.
As has been noted earlier and as has been widely chronicled, one deficiency of the 
“best interests” model is its inherent subjectivity.  That, of course, is true. “Best interests” 
represents an opinion, and in a given case the attorney may lack the knowledge or 
expertise to formulate that opinion.  Further, unlike an expert forensic or other witness, 
his opinion is not tested through the crucible of cross-examination.  However, there are 
additional and, perhaps more fundamental flaws in employing that standard to legal 
representation. 
172
 See Part III, Section 2, pp. 52, 53.
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First, the “best interests” of the child is largely irrelevant unless and until parental 
malfeasance has been proven (neglect, abuse or dependency).173  Counsel for the child 
may believe firmly and may be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her client’s 
“best interests” require placement, but that position is irrelevant in the absence of a 
finding of abuse or neglect, and the entry of an appropriate adjudicatory order.  Similarly, 
concluding in a termination of parental rights case that the child should be adopted is 
meaningless, unless and until the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
sufficient facts exist to permit termination.  Given the fact that “best interests” are 
irrelevant for much of the proceeding, the legislative penchant of telling attorneys for 
children that they must advocate only “best interests” is rather nonsensical.174
For other reasons, the prescription to advocate “best interests” for dispositional 
purposes is equally nonsensical.  “Best interests” is the legal standard to be applied by the 
court in determining a post-finding disposition, and is accordingly the standard which 
controls every party’s argument.175  The parent’s attorney argues “best interests”, the 
173
 Although the “best interests” standard plays no role in adjudication of guilt, it may, in part, guide 
preliminary orders, such as temporary removal or protective orders.  See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, A 
Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham Law Review 1399 (1996) at 
1429.
174
 One could say that the ultimate goal should guide counsel, and that his position at the adjudication level 
should be shaped by that goal.  Although true to some extent –- and lawyers are used to working backward 
from the hoped for disposition – the suggestion falls apart in many cases.  Say, for example, that the child’s 
best interest is to remain home coupled with parental supervision and services.  Should the lawyer in that 
event assist in proving the case, thereby risking that the child will be placed, or should  he assist the 
defense, and thereby risk that the child will remain at home without adequate supervision or services?  Or, 
as a third alternative, should the lawyer sit on her hands?
175
 See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §625, governing the disposition of a termination of parental rights case:  
“An order of disposition shall be made . . . solely on the basis of the best interests of the child, and there 
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petitioning agency or prosecuting attorney agues “best interests”; and so must the child’s 
attorney.  Each may have a radically different position, but each has the responsibility of 
convincing the court, to the greatest extent possible, that her position equates with “best 
interests”.
Telling the child’s attorney to advocate “best interests” is like telling the attorney 
for a spouse in a divorce proceeding to argue that the marital property should be 
distributed “equitably”.  Of course – that’s the law.  The bar needs no statutory reminder, 
and would find a legislative admonition to argue “equitable distribution” insulting.  Nor 
do lawyers need prompting to argue that each of their respective clients should be 
awarded, in accord with “equitable distribution”, the Alfa Romeo purchased by the 
couple last year.  They know what their client’s interests are, and know how to shape the 
argument to the substantive law.  The lawyer for the child is in precisely the same 
position.
As has been discussed, the idea of expressing the child’s wishes originated with 
the first statute granting the child counsel,176 and has been a persistent theme.  However, 
that is not how lawyers usually view their relationship with their client, young or old.  It 
is not that simple.  For example, virtually every defendant in a criminal case wishes to be 
acquitted – and makes that point to counsel.  And, indeed, the attorney ordinarily 
shall be no presumption that such interests will be promoted by any particular disposition”.  It has also been 
observed that, in part because of the _______ role overlap in the lawyer timing a “best interest” approval, 
lawyers who represent their clients’ best interests are too passive and are too ready to follow the direction 
of the state.  In contrast, lawyers who represent their clients’ wishes are more independent of state influence 
and are more involved with their clients and their cases.  Ramsey, supra, note at 320.
176
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §241; see p. 8.
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attempts to find justification for dismissal.  Nevertheless, at the end of the day most 
defendants plead guilty.  That’s not their wish – it’s reality.  The client is convinced by 
counsel to plead guilty, often after intense negotiations and discussions.  And counsel 
may have to be more persuasive in dealing with his client than in dealing with his 
adversary.  In other words, a lawyer doesn’t simply take the client’s wish and run, telling 
the court that, after all, she’s only expressing her client’s desires.  Rather, through 
discussions with her opponent, a sober evaluation of the evidence, and through often 
difficult discussions with her client, the defendant agrees to a settlement to avoid the risk 
of a harsher outcome.  So it goes with most cases, civil or criminal.
To bring the matter closer to home, counsel for the parent in a child protective 
case is never instructed by the legislature or the court to advocate the client’s wishes. The 
parent usually wishes to be exonerated, and counsel will work for that result whenever 
feasible.  But most cases are resolved with an admission, coupled with a negotiated 
disposition.  Frequently, the lawyer has to labor intensively to convince the client to agree 
to a specific resolution (the client may be adamant despite the counter riding evidence)177.  
If all fails, counsel must try the case.
The attorney-client relationship is reflected in the applicable rules of professional 
responsibility.  Thus, Rule 1.2 of the American Bar Association Rules provides that, 
subject to qualification, “. . . a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision concerning the 
177
 In a few cases, counsel’s efforts to achieve client consent may fail, and, as a last resort, the case must 
proceed to trial.
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objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which 
they are to be pursued.”  The attorney needs to follow the client’s objectives and needs 
the client’s agreement, or at least her acquiescence, in making the major decisions, 
including a proposed disposition.178  The approach respects, but does not depend entirely 
on the client’s desires.  The relationship is collaborative.  The attorney advises his client 
of the law and his evaluation of the facts.  The client (usually) respects the lawyers’ 
professional judgment.  An equivalent equation should be applied when representing the 
child, unless the child is of insufficient age or is otherwise too impaired to permit even an 
approximation of the ordinary attorney-client relationship.
With these factors in mind, it is not surprising that the caselaw covering the 
child’s attorney’s role and responsibility is inconsistent.  Neither “best interests” nor 
“wishes” suffice.  Compounding the dichotomy, it may be difficult or impossible to 
determine which model a given attorney is following in a given case.   Is her position 
based on the child’s wishes, is it posited on the child’s “best interests”, or, for that matter, 
is it a fusion position between wishes and best interest extremes, and does the child 
178
 A telling example of an accepted or at least tolerated attorney-client dynamic is the recent United States 
Supreme Court case of Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 160 L.Ed.2d 565, 125 S.Ct. 551 (2004).  In a death 
penalty case the client appealed on the ground that he had not consented to his attorney’s strategy of 
conceding guilt at trial (and arguing mitigation).  The defendant had indeed never agreed to counsel’s 
suggestion, but had not articulated any disagreement.  The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
death sentence:
When counsel informs defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant’s 
best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel’s strategic choice is not impeded 
by any blanket rule demanding the defendant’s explicit consent; 125 S.Ct. 551, 563.
Nixon may not portray a good representative model for adults or for children, but it does underscore the 
wide scope of attorney discretion in pursuing a case.
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agreed, acquiesced, has even stated a position?  Given the inconsistencies in the statutory 
and caselaw, any of the above may be the credible explanation for the attorney’s 
articulated position.  And, unless expressed by counsel, the court cannot discern the basis 
of the lawyer’s position or strategy.  The rather primitive and conflicting existing 
formulas should be abandoned.
Section 2.  Defining the Appropriate Attorney-Child Client Relationship
The building blocks of a better representation model are essentially outlined in 
Part II.  The foundation is the legal interests and rights of the child.  Of equal significance 
is the child’s status in the proceeding, her right to representation, and the appropriate 
level of her presence and participation, i.e., the child’s involvement.  As in any case, the 
attorney’s role and responsibilities must reflect  the client’s rights, interests, and risks.
The child’s legal interests include protection, family integrity, continuing 
relationships with parents, siblings, grandparents, and other important persons in the 
child’s life, individual autonomy, and the delivery of appropriate services, including 
medical, psychological counseling, educational, and homemaker assistance.  The 
formidable legal interests array, outlined more specifically in Part II, and the complex 
subsets and variations within each identified interest, is what counsel should be 
evaluating, obtaining supporting evidence, and subsequently advocating within the 
context of “best interests” (I have no quibble with “best interests” as a substantive legal 
standard).  The “best interests” plan, however, need not and should not be created out of 
the attorney’s perceptions and independent judgment.  Instead, a collaborative endeavor 
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between client and attorney must be forged. For this purpose, the child must know her 
legal rights and options, just as the adult client must be apprised of the case’s parameters.  
The attorney’s role is to explain the relevant legal interests, outline the feasible specific 
case options, and develop a case plan with the child’s involvement.179  The attorney 
should almost never ask her child client (or her adult client) the point black question 
“what are your wishes”, but, rather, counsel the child concerning these issues, discuss 
alternatives, advise as the feasibility of differing approaches and outcomes, and, finally, 
seek the child’s guidance.180
Counsel should also assume that the child has a constitutional right to 
representation. As discussed in Part I, Section 3, several courts have concluded that the 
right to counsel is of constitutional dimensions (though the issue has yet to be definitively 
determined nationally).  Accordingly, the child is entitled to effective representation, i.e., 
counsel who takes a position and fights for his client’s interests (and not a guardian ad 
litem who writes a report with recommendations, and, then is heard no more or, worse, 
testifies in defense of his report).  And the child is entitled to effective representation 
regardless of any contrary legislative prescription.
Similarly, counsel should advocate that the child has full party status (see Part II, 
Section 2).  In several states the child indeed enjoys formal party status, by statute or 
179
 See Jean Koh Peters, supra, note 22, Chapter 4, pp. 77-98.
180
 In discussions between attorney and client, the client’s wishes may be evident (e.g., exoneration or 
maximum financial recovery), or may depend on the legal alternatives and possibilities as outlined by 
counsel (e.g., whether to reject a settlement offer).  Lawyers learn how to structure a discussion to 
incorporate the myriad factors.
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through caselaw.  In many others, the child has gained most of the rights of a party 
without formal designation – in other words, has gained de facto recognition as a party to 
the proceedings.  Counsel should be guided accordingly, i.e. assert “party” rights.  As 
attorney for a party, counsel may file motions, serve notice, subpoena, depose, call 
witnesses, cross-exam, appeal, issue legal demands, and attend conferences --  to list 
some of the obvious attorney powers.  On the other hand, as attorney for a party the 
lawyer cannot engage in ex parte judicial conversations, draft reports or testify, i.e., 
cannot act as a guardian ad litem.  When necessary, the attorney should litigate the issue 
at the trial and appellate court levels, a measure that has succeeded in several states.  
Last, as a party the child is entitled to be present and participate in the proceedings, a 
right her counsel should implement.
To my mind, the child’s presence and participation is crucial.  Bringing the child 
into the proceedings and, literally, into the courtroom, would constitute an enormous 
achievement (unless the child is very young or is otherwise impaired or for other reasons; 
see the next section).  As has been discussed in Part II, Section 4, the child’s presence, 
and surely the child’s participation, are not precluded in any jurisdiction (at least to this 
author’s knowledge).  And at least one state, California, requires, with some exceptions, 
that the older child be present in court.  By itself, the child’s presence would dramatically 
change the attorney-client dynamic.  First, the attorney would have to discuss the 
proceedings, the meaning of different legal events, and the possible case outcomes with 
child prior to the relevant court date.  Second, if the child were present the attorney could 
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hardly advocate a position without her involvement.  The relationship would perforce 
become more collaborative, and less attorney directed.  And the child’s presence would 
be a check on attorney laziness or incompetence; it’s not as easy when your client is 
standing next to you.
Finally, the child would be present and available when the near inevitable 
settlement negotiations take place.  For better or for worse, child protective cases are 
discussed and frequently determined in attorney conference rooms, mediation sessions, 
or, for that matter, in the corridors of the courthouse.181  The practice has been to exclude 
the child from the building, and thereby from the give and take of the discussions.  Yet 
the child may be able to participate in a meaningful way – and in a way which satisfies all 
the parties.  (No one would seriously think of excluding a different party, such as the 
parent.)  Johnny may not have thought of the possibility of living with his aunt while 
mom is in rehab, but that option, first raised in a hurried courthouse discussion, may be 
just what he wants.  How could his attorney know that, if Johnny is absent from the 
scene?  How can the attorney work through the frequently complex case logistics without 
his client?  For example, Billy may want to stay where he is until the end of the Middle 
School basketball season so he can remain on the team – and then move in with Aunt 
Alice.  Or Mary, who has been in placement, may object or, alternatively, may prefer the 
new expanded visitation schedule her father demands as a quid pro quo for not contesting 
181
 The luxury of a more elaborative negotiation process outside the courthouse is not available to many 
attorneys who provide representation in protective cases.
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continued placement.  How can her lawyer know in her absence?  Or know that the 
requested visitation schedule conflicts with Mary’s school activities?  In addition, the 
child’s presence might help her understand and “buy into” the disposition – a participant 
is more likely to be satisfied than one who has been excluded.  And the child could even 
meet that remote figure, the judge, in the courtroom or in chambers,182 formally, through 
an in-camera interview, or informally, by just saying hello. 
Of course, presence of the child cannot be universal.  It is usually inappropriate to 
bring the very young child to the courthouse. And the adolescent child should not be 
present when sensitive parental psychological and psychiatric reports are discussed, to 
cite but one example.  Further, presence in the courthouse should not in every instance 
lead to courtroom presence.  There are occasions when the child should be present in 
court, occasions when he should be present during negotiations, and occasions when he 
should be present in the courthouse and thereby available for attorney-client discussions 
(but not appear in court or participate in negotiations).  The idea is to maximize 
children’s involvement without micro-managing the details.183
Section 3.  The Young Child
The traditional representation model cannot be applied to the very young.  
Obviously, an infant or a preverbal child should not be expected to assume the role of a 
182
 On occasion, I have brought the older child to court to meet the judge, just to say hello.  It’s always a 
positive experience.
183
 One impediment to the child’s presence is the horrendous physical state of many urban juvenile and 
family courts.  But, then, I suspect it would be more feasible to obtaining the funding to improve the 
environment if children were actually present.
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“client” in the manner envisioned by the rules of professional responsibility, or form a 
relationship with an attorney which even remotely resembles the standard attorney-client 
arrangement.  Since child protective cases involve children of every age, those who 
advocate a traditional model need an alternative or default approach.184  Further, applying 
a traditional model to children necessitates defining a boundary; just when does a minor 
reach the stage when he should be treated by his attorney as though he were an adult 
client?
Several possible solutions have been proposed.  Professor Guggenheim has 
suggested that the young child’s attorney assume a “neutral” position and desist from 
articulating a specific outcome.185  That would significantly ameliorate  the problem, but 
at a substantial cost.186  The younger child would be effectively unrepresented, and, at 
least in the absence of a guardian ad litem would have no representative to argue for his 
interests.  The system would revert to the pre-Gault era for that age group.
The American Bar Association approach is to retain the attorney role when the 
child is very young, but add to the mix through appointment of a guardian ad litem:
To the extent that a child cannot express a preference, the child’s attorney 
should make a good faith effort to determine the child’s wishes and 
advocate accordingly or request the appointment of a guardian ad litem.187
184
 On the other  hand, the “guardian ad litem” or “best interests” school need not worry.  Counsel can 
formulate and articulate her view of “best interests” regardless of the child’s age, a fact which adds the 
allure of a straight “best interests” approach.
185
 Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, LXIV Fordham 
Law Review, 1399 at p. 1416 (1996).
186
 It is also questionable whether children just above age seven possess the requisite competency.
187
 American Bar Association Standards, supra note 77, Standard B-4(1).
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The problem is that the request for an independent guardian ad litem will almost always 
fall upon deaf ears.  American legislators believe that the attorney should act as the 
guardian ad litem,188 and are not about to fund a companion guardian ad litem.  Another 
disadvantage of the ABA standard is the assumption that a child of sufficient age to 
verbalize a preference is also of sufficient age to guide the attorney, i.e. maintain at least 
an approximation of the “adult” attorney-client relationship.  That is not always true.  A 
five year old may be able to verbalize a preference, but may be incapable of 
understanding the basic ramifications of that preference.
It is, of course, possible to appoint both a guardian ad litem and an attorney in 
each and every case, and allocate decision making in accord with the child’s abilities. The 
United Kingdom does just that.  The court must appoint a guardian ad litem in almost 
every “care” proceeding (equivalent to neglect, abuse or dependency) from a certified list
of social workers.189  The guardian ad litem, who is publicly compensated, then retains an 
attorney, who is also paid by the government.190  In turn, the attorney follows the 
instructions of the guardian ad litem unless the child is of sufficient age and maturity to 
guide the attorney, whereupon the attorney “takes instructions” from the child, i.e., 
188
 See Part III, Section 1.
189
 Children Act 1989, Ch. 41, §41(1); the court is required to appoint “unless it is satisfied that it is not 
necessary to safeguard the child’s interest”; in practice, such a finding is rare.
190
 Family Proceedings Rules, 1991, Rule 4.11.
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assumes a more traditional attorney-client relationship.191  The presence of a guardian ad 
litem, coupled with a clear demarcation of authority, enables the attorney to assume in a 
child oriented approach, incorporating even the younger child’s desires (say the nine year 
old, who may lack full competency to engage in the ordinary attorney-client relationship 
but has definitive preferences).  As noted by one British children’s law scholar:
It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that it is the role of the child’s 
solicitor to act as an advocate for the child.  His advocacy should be based 
upon the child’s stated wishes and feelings.  It is the role of the guardian 
ad litem to ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child and to take those 
views fully into consideration in putting a view to the court about what is 
in the best interests of the child.  The conflict arises from the fact that what 
the child wants may not be what the child needs.  In a situation of 
divergence between the views of the child and the guardian ad litem, the 
solicitor is placed in a difficult position, but it should be made clear that 
his role is to stand firmly alongside his client, the child, and continue to 
put the views of that child to the court as forcibly as would be the case if 
the guardian ad litem were in agreement with the views expressed.  The 
appropriate balance between rights and welfare can only be achieved if the 
solicitor stands his ground on behalf of the child, even in the face of 
opposition from the guardian ad litem.192
The British approach offers several advantages, and may constitute the best model.  But it 
is costly, necessitating governmental expenditures for the social work guardian ad litem 
and the attorney.  For that reason it is not likely to be adopted in this country, or at least 
will not be implemented wholesale in the foreseeable future.
191
 Family Proceedings Rules, 1991, 4.12(1)(a).
192
 Judith E. Timms, Children’s Representation, A Practitioner’s Guide, Sweet and Maxwell, 1995, at p. 
104.  Timms continues by cautioning that some solicitors nevertheless “have watered down the strength of 
their advocacy” to accommodate the guardian ad litem’s position.  But see Judith Masson, Representing 
Children in England: Protecting Children in Child Protection Proceedings, 34 Fam. L. Q. 467 (2000); 
Masson argues that English attorneys often avoid following the child’s instructions.
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That leaves us with the present American situation, whereby counsel is virtually 
on his own.  And the attorney will ordinarily maintain a caseload involving children 
ranging from infants to adolescents. When representing the preverbal child, and in the 
absence of a separate guardian ad litem, counsel has no choice but to independently 
evaluate the case and advocate her conclusions regarding the child’s interests.  For some 
issues, and in some cases, that may be a relatively easy task.  If the child needs 
specialized services, such as medical care, counsel’s position concerning that topic 
should be clear.  If the young child has been abandoned or seriously abused and an 
acceptable kinship arrangement is possible, the lawyer’s strategy is obvious.  If the parent 
needs rehabilitative services, it is in the child’s interest to insure implementation (and 
counsel may have to fight for appropriate services or placement).  Other cases may 
necessitate tough choices for the very young child’s attorney, but that, under the present 
system, cannot be avoided.
On the other hand, for the older child, including most pre-adolescents, there is no 
reason to compromise the attorney-client relationship.  Children above the age of ten 
usually comprehend the issues and are capable of formulating a position with the 
assistance of counsel (even if, on occasion, the assistance should be more structured than 
with an adult).
That leaves an intermediate age range, generally ages five through ten, where 
counsel faces, or should face, the tricky task of maximizing the child’s input and 
participation without necessarily granting her a veto over her attorney’s position (or, in 
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some cases, even soliciting the young client’s preference).  The required lawyering skills 
and competences have been addressed in several publications, and are beyond the scope 
of this article.193 The issue is also addressed in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct:  “When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered decisions in 
connection with a representation is diminished . . . because of minority . . . the lawyer 
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the 
client”.194  As an ethical matter, the attorney is obligated to maximize the idicia of a 
normal attorney-client collaborative relationship with the young child.
A few brief observations may provide some additional perspective. Children do 
not suddenly mature; one does not wake up one morning and pass the magic divide into 
legal capacity.  It’s a gradual process, one that a child’s attorney should carefully 
evaluate.  Further, a given child may be competent regarding some issues, but not others. 
For example, the seven year old may not understand why he has been removed from the 
home he knows, but may be perfectly competent to advise his counsel concerning a 
substitute home (say with a relative).  I have often been surprised by the insight of a child 
as young as five (which is not to say that every five year old is insightful), and happy to 
advocate a position consistent with the client’s wishes.  Children are also frequently able 
193
 See, e.g., Jean Koh Peters, supra note 22 at pp. 112-145, and Judith E. Timms, supra note 192.
194
 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note ____, Rule 1.14(a).  The commentary to the rule 
advises that “. . . a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and 
reach conclusions about matters affecting the client’s own well-being.  For example, children as young as 
five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are 
entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody.”
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to understand the realities and the ramifications of a given course of action. For example, 
a ten year old may wish to remain home with her drug addicted mother, but may 
understand and accept her counsel’s private statements that the court will never agree, 
and that the better course is to advocate for the help her mother needs, with the goal of 
minimizing the placement duration while maximizing visitation; as soon as mom is 
ready, counsel will advocate reunification.  Lawyers give similarly difficult advice to 
clients of every age.  And clients of every age usually take counsel’s advice, or agree to 
compromise their position.195  The skills we learn in school and hone in practice are ones 
we often utilize when dealing with our clients as well as with our adversaries.  We should 
not dismiss the child or cease communications which may lead to an agreed upon 
approach simply because our client is young.
As noted, for the older child, including adolescents, most pre-adolescents and 
young adults, 196 the normal attorney-client relationship, or at least an approximation of 
that relationship, should always prevail.  The dynamics are outlined in the preceding 
section.  Ergo, a very significant percentage of children involved in protective 
proceedings should be equated with adults for purposes of the attorney-client 
relationship.  And most children, excluding the preverbal, should be involved and 
195
 Children may, in fact, acquiesce more readily when in their attorney’s recommendation.  I have found 
most eight year olds  be more flexible and amenable than the obstructionist adult client.
196
 Although jurisdiction in an initial child protective case ordinary ceases when the child attains the age of 
eighteen, he child may be in placement far beyond the age of majority.  For example, in New York, Family 
Court Act Section 1055-a(g) (McKinney’s 2004) stipulates that “no placement may be made or continued 
beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday without his or her consent and in no event past his or her twenty-
first birthday.”  I have personally represented “children” who were twenty years of age.
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engaged with their attorney, even when the arrangement falls somewhat short of a 
complete client oriented approach.  Last, it is worth noting that child protective 
proceedings frequently span several years, commencing with the initial case, through 
extension of placements, permanency hearings, perhaps termination of parental rights 
proceedings, and adoption.  Children do not remain at the same level.  The child’s 
attorney may start with a young client, but conclude with an adolescent client.  A 
perceptive broad approach, one which engages the child to the maximum extent possible, 
will in the long run be rewarding to the child and to the attorney.
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CONCLUSION
The concept that children who are involved in child protective proceedings are 
entitled to legal representation is of recent origin.  Perhaps remarkably in light of the 
historic animosity to representation, today a clear majority of children are assigned 
counsel – and universal representation may be achievable in the near future.  The positive 
development of representation, however, has been compromised by the absence of a 
consensus concerning the role of counsel, and a parallel absence concerning the specific 
role and rights of the child.  A majority of the applicable state statutes provide that 
counsel should represent the child’s “best interests”, as does the Federal CAPTA Act.  On 
the other hand, a significant number of statutes also stipulate that the attorney should 
represent or convey to the court the child’s “wishes.”  Simultaneously, the organized bar 
and the academy have gravitated toward either a child’s “wishes” or a traditional 
attorney-client model.  Given the mix of unrealistic and often inconsistent statutes, and 
the influence of the organized bar, it is not surprising that the caselaw has been 
hopelessly confused and conflicted.
The maturation of children’s representation may be realized only by jettisoning 
the “best interests” and the “child’s wishes” approaches.  Legislatures should simply get 
out of the business of telling lawyers how they should represent the child client by 
repealing a nonsensical statutory prescription, one which only mimics the relevant 
substantive law.  In the absence of a statutory evolution – and legislatures have evidenced 
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no inclination to move beyond “best interests” – lawyers for children should be guided by 
standards promulgated by the organized bar, determine their role independently 
(irrespective of the statutory prescriptions), and advocate for specific children’s rights 
and interests.  Attorneys should also use specific legislative provisions which benefit 
their client, even when those provisions conflict with the overarching “best interests” 
approach.  For example, the attorneys should implement the child’s right to choose 
counsel by applying the “right to choose” statutes (where they exist), and by carefully 
outlining the possibility with every child client.  Similarly, the attorney should emphasize 
the child’s right to be heard both directly and indirectly (through counsel).
One significant advance would be a concerted effort to enforce the child’s 
constitutional right to counsel, and the right to effective counsel.  The constitutional 
principle has been recognized whenever raised, establishing a precedent which should be 
replicated nationally.  There is simply no excuse to forgo an assertion on the basic 
constitutional principle.  Another fertile issue worth pursuing is party status.  Recognition 
that the child is indeed a party in interest, with the significant ramifications flowing from 
party status, has been accomplished in several jurisdictions and the child has been granted 
“virtual” party status in several additional states.  Universal acceptance should be 
achievable through the rigorous litigation if the issue by attorneys who represent children 
throughout the country.  Attorneys should also remain continually cognizant of the child-
client’s specific legal interests, including protection, family integrity, autonomy and 
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ameliorative services, and should zealously work with their clients to implement each 
specific right.  
The remaining issue, one which is key to the maturization of legal representation, 
is the child’s presence and participation.  Good lawyering is dependent upon client 
involvement, whether the client be six or sixty years of age.  The majority of children 
should be in the courthouse, as in California, where they can discuss the case with 
counsel, assert their position, and, when appropriate, be present in the courtroom seated 
next to their attorney, as is every other party.  It is incumbent on the lawyer to utilize 
every appropriate mechanism to maximize the child’s involvement, whether that be 
intensive client consultation, the development of client goals, the child’s participation in 
the proceedings or the employment of in-court testimony or in-camera interview.
The legal profession knows the elements of effective lawyering.  In my opinion, 
what is needed is the application of those elements to children’s representation.  There 
are several precedents and positive trends upon which a better system may be 
constructed.  The culmination, clearly achievable, is a collaborative attorney child-client 
relationship based upon the child’s legally cognizable substantive rights (e.g., protection, 
autonomy, family integrity and governmental services), one which equals or at least 
closely approximates the historic traditional approach to fulfilling individual legal needs 
and rights.
